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OREGON’S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: PUBLIC
RIGHTS IN WATERS, WILDLIFE, AND BEACHES
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM* & ERIKA DOOT**

Oregon’s public trust doctrine has been misunderstood. The
doctrine has not been judicially interpreted in over thirty years but was
the subject of an Oregon Attorney General’s opinion in 2005. That
opinion interpreted the scope of the doctrine to be limited to the beds
of tidelands and navigable-for-title waters, and erected a separate
“public use” doctrine protecting public rights in other waters, including
recreational waters. However, since Oregon courts have never limited
public rights in the state’s waters to those with publicly owned
bedlands, the opinion should have recognized that the public trust
doctrine provides broad public recreational rights in all waters. Indeed,
since early statehood, Oregon courts and the legislature have
recognized that water is publicly owned, and the Oregon Supreme
Court has ruled consistently in favor of public rights in waterways,
based on language in the Statehood Act that declared navigable waters
to be public highways that would remain “forever free,” not
monopolized by private owners. Moreover, in the early twentieth
century, the court explicitly ruled that the scope of public rights in
publicly owned waters could and should evolve over time.
This Article maintains that Oregon’s public trust doctrine is
grounded on public ownership of natural resources held in trust by the
state in sovereign ownership. The state has always claimed ownership
of water and wildlife within the state, so the courts should recognize
both as public trust resources. Although the state can authorize private
rights in those resources, all private rights are subject to the state’s
sovereign ownership—a public easement—requiring the state to
maintain these resources as trustee for the public. Like the Statehood
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Act’s declaration of public ownership of waterways, courts should
interpret the public trust doctrine to be implicit in other statutory
declarations of public ownership of natural resources. Similarly, use
rights in ocean beaches, claimed by the public under the doctrine of
custom, are public trust resources, necessary to enable public use of
the adjacent publicly owned tidelands. This Article suggests that
public ancillary rights exist in other uplands where necessary to
provide public access to, or preservation of, public trust water and
wildlife resources.
Oregon’s public trust doctrine is not of mere academic interest.
The doctrine imposes duties on the state as sovereign owner of water,
wildlife, and ancillary uplands. In an era of widespread skepticism of
government management, the venerable public trust doctrine seems an
especially appropriate mechanism to give citizens an opportunity to
gain review of government action and inaction threatening
unsustainable development of natural resources that are central to the
state’s identity, culture, and economy.
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 376
II. THE 2005 ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION ........................................................................... 382
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I. INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine (PTD) in Oregon has a long and venerable
history, dating to numerous nineteenth and early twentieth century court
decisions that consistently recognized public rights in navigable waters.1
Shortly after statehood in 1859, Oregon courts acknowledged paramount
public rights of navigation, fishing, and commerce in navigable-in-fact
waterways, regardless of bed ownership.2 Since 1918, the Oregon Supreme

1
2

See infra note 7; see also infra notes 59–61, 69–119, 126 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 450 (1869) (stating that navigable waterways are

“public highways” that each person has “an undoubted right to use . . . for all legitimate
purposes of trade and transportation”); Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 411–12 (1877)
(commenting that as “owner of the tide lands, [the state] had the power . . . to sell the same. It
has, however, no authority to dispose of its tide-lands in such a manner as may interfere with
the free and untrammeled navigation of its rivers, bays, inlets, and the like”); Wilson v. Welch, 7
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Court has recognized public rights to use all navigable-in-fact waters for
recreational purposes, within the scope of commerce protected by the
public navigation easement.3 Oregon courts have consistently acknowledged
broad public rights in state-owned natural resources, explaining that, like
other common law doctrines, the PTD evolves as public uses change
over time.4
Although the early Oregon Supreme Court did not employ the phrase
“public trust doctrine”—the term was not widely used before Professor
Joseph Sax published his influential article in 19705—many other states have
recognized that public recreational uses are protected navigation rights
under the PTD over the last forty years.6 But there is little modern case law
on the Oregon PTD,7 giving rise to substantial questions about the extent of
P. 341, 344 (Or. 1885) (observing that the state owns the “navigable river[s] within its
boundaries, and the shore of its bays, harbors, and inlets between high and low water, but its
ownership is a trust for the public. . . . It cannot sell [the lands] so as to deprive the public of their
enjoyment”); Parker v. W. Coast Packing Co., 21 P. 822, 824 (Or. 1889) (recognizing that a
riparian landowner “may apply such [water] frontage to any use not inconsistent with the rights
of the public”); Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P. 154, 156 (Or. 1892) (holding that title to tidelands acquired
from the state continues to be burdened by the jus publicum and “subject only to the paramount
right of navigation”), aff’d, 152 U.S. 1, 52–54 (1894).
3 See Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065, 1073 (Or. 1907) (explaining that the public
has the right to fish in waters over privately owned beds); Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P.
437, 442 (Or. 1918) (holding that all waters in the state capable of navigation by small craft can
be used for recreational purposes); Luscher v. Reynolds, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936)
(explaining that the public had the right to use privately owned lakes because “[r]egardless of
the ownership of the bed, the public has the paramount right to the use of the waters . . . for the
purpose of transportation and commerce,” including transportation for pleasure).
4 Guilliams, 175 P. at 442 (ruling that protected public navigational uses of waters include
“sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and
even city purposes, cutting ice, and other public purposes which cannot now be enumerated or
even anticipated” (quoting Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893))); see also infra
Part III.A (discussing the evolution of public navigation, fishing, and recreational water uses
protected by the Oregon PTD).
5 See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475–89 (1970) (tracing the PTD to English
and Roman law and describing its development in early American cases, including Shively, 30 P.
154, and Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)).
6 See, e.g., Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170–71 (Mont. 1984)
(recognizing public rights to use all waters for recreational purposes without regard to bed
ownership under the state constitution and PTD); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach
Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 123–24 (N.J. 2005) (holding that a private beach club must provide
public access but could charge a reasonable management fee); Harrison C. Dunning, Sources of
the Public Right, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.04 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds.,
3d ed. 2011) (describing the public ownership of water concept in Idaho, Montana, New Mexico,
South Dakota, and Wyoming).
7 Since the late 1800s, Oregon courts have repeatedly announced broad public rights in all
waters in the state, sometimes discussing the right to use adjacent uplands. See, e.g., Weise, 3
Or. at 450–51; Hinman, 6 Or. at 411–12; Wilson, 7 P. at 344; Guilliams, 175 P. at 442. Yet Oregon
courts have not addressed the PTD since the 1979 decision of Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands,
590 P.2d 709, 713–14 (Or. 1979) (en banc) (explaining that the Director of the Department of
State Lands may authorize dredging or filling of trust lands if the administrative record
contained a record finding that the “public need” for a project outweighed the damage to
resources). See infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. The Oregon Supreme Court applied
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the doctrine and its effects on public and private rights in Oregon’s
natural resources.8
In 2005, after receiving a request from the state treasurer, the Attorney
General (AG) issued an opinion on the scope of the Oregon PTD.9 The lack
of recent case law made it impossible for the AG to resolve definitively
several questions about the relationship between public use rights and
riparian landowner rights.10 For example, the AG was unable to offer
guidance as to whether the public may use the beds of all navigable-in-fact
waters to the ordinary high water mark for recreational purposes ancillary to
public navigation rights, or whether the public may cross private uplands
when necessary to access navigable waters.11 The AG did not limit public
recreational rights to use state-owned submerged lands under navigable-fortitle waters12—but he provided little clarification on the scope of public
rights to use beds that may be privately owned when navigating, fishing, and
recreating on waterways in the state.13

the related doctrine of customary rights to Oregon ocean beaches in State ex rel. Thornton v.
Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673, 677–78 & n.6 (Or. 1969), a principle that was affirmed in Stevens v. City
of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 454–57, 460 (Or. 1993) (en banc) (rejecting assertions that the
State’s denial of a permit to construct a seawall was an unconstitutional taking), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1207 (1994), and McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714, 724 (Or. 1989) (en banc)
(declining to extend public use rights to a large upland tidepool because the area was physically
separated from the shoreline and was not customarily used by the public), a case that was
misinterpreted by Justice Scalia. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
8 Janet C. Neuman, Oregon, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § II (Robert E. Beck & Amy K.
Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2011) (discussing the controversy over Oregon’s declaration of navigable-fortitle waters that led to the attorney general’s opinion on public use rights in Oregon waters
in 2005).
9 State Land Board, 8281 Op. Or. Att’y Gen. 24 (2005) (recognizing public rights to recreate
in navigable-for-title waters under the PTD as well as public rights to recreate in waters capable
of
recreational
use
under
the
“public
use”
doctrine),
available
at
http://www.oregon.gov/DSL/NAV/docs/ag_op-8281_navigability.pdf?ga=t [hereinafter 2005 AG
Opinion]. See generally Matthew Preusch, Decision Opens John Day River, OREGONIAN, June 15,
2005, at B1, B4 (describing the political controversy surrounding public rights to use Oregon
waterways in 2005).
10 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 24 (explaining that the “owner may not prevent the
public from floating down a waterway,” but not elaborating on other landowner rights that are
“not inconsistent with public use [and] remain with the riparian landowner”) (citing Shaw v.
Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 381–83 (1882)); see also Matthew Preusch, Who Owns Oregon’s
Rivers?, OREGONIAN, Mar. 9, 2008, at C4; Matthew Preusch, Oregon Land Board Says State Owns
89-Mile Stretch of Rogue, OREGONIAN, June 10, 2008, http://www.oregonlive.com/
environment/index.ssf/2008/06/oregon_land_board_says_state_o.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2012); Matthew Preusch, Oregon River Rights Still in Question as Montana Governor Signs
Stream Access Bill, OREGONIAN, Apr. 15, 2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/
index.ssf/2009/04/oregon_river_rights_still_in_q.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
11 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 24–27.
12 See Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224 (1845) (holding states received title to
lands underlying navigable-for-title waterways when admitted to the Union under the equal
footing doctrine).
13 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 16–24 (describing what the AG Opinion considered the
“public use doctrine,” a seemingly more limited class of public rights to use navigable-in-fact
waters with privately owned beds). For waterways in which the beds have not been declared to
be state-owned, the AG simply stated that an individual may “decide for himself” what his rights
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The 2005 AG opinion assumed that the PTD applies only to navigablefor-title waters with state-owned beds.14 The opinion also attempted to
explain how a so-called “public use” doctrine, or floatage easement, applies
to privately owned waters that are navigable-in-fact but not navigable-fortitle, that is, those with privately owned beds.15 This analysis was flawed
because it failed to recognize that waters historically susceptible of
floatation by small craft or even seasonal log floats satisfy the federal test of
title navigability.16 Further, by limiting public rights in waters over private
beds, the opinion adopted an unnecessarily constrained view of the PTD
because the Oregon Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized a public
easement in all navigable-in-fact waters for navigation, fishing, commerce,
and recreation, and has also articulated limited ancillary rights to
use uplands.17
The 2005 AG opinion recognized that case law does not limit public use
rights to navigable-for-title waters in Oregon.18 Indeed, since 1869, the
Oregon Supreme Court has consistently recognized broad public rights in all
navigable-in-fact waters, regardless of ownership of the underlying land.19
By restricting the PTD to navigable-for-title waters, the AG confused the
scope of public rights because the courts have never limited public use
rights to these waters, and the PTD protects public uses like recreational
boating and floating in all lawfully accessed state waters.20
The courts and the State Land Board have not ascertained ownership of
the beds of most state waters,21 which has created substantial confusion
to use the waterway are as a member of the public, “tak[ing] the risk that his use will be a
trespass if he is mistaken.” Id. at 27–28.
14 See id. at 1–2.
15 Id. at 16–19, 23–24.
16 See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10–11 (1971) (citing Daniel Ball, 77 U.S (10 Wall.)
557, 563 (1870)).
17 Compare infra Part II (discussing the AG opinion), with Weise, 3 Or. 445, 450–51 (1869)
(recognizing that regardless of bed ownership, “a stream . . . generally useful for floating boats,
rafts, or logs, for any useful purpose of agriculture or trade, though it be private property, and
not strictly navigable, is subject to the public use as a passage-way”); Felger v. Robinson, 3 Or.
455, 458 (1869) (reiterating that loggers had the right to raft logs on waters overlying privately
owned beds because “any stream . . . is navigable on whose waters logs or timbers can be
floated to market, and [] they are public highway for that purpose,” and explaining that “it is
not necessary that they be navigable the whole year to constitute them such”); Shaw v. Oswego
Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 382–83 (1882) (affirming the trial court’s order enjoining a landowner from
diverting water to a mill in a manner that interfered with public use of the water for floating
logs); Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 442–43 (Or. 1918) (affirming the trial court’s
ruling a landowner could not build a dam for flood control that would interfere with public use
of a nearby lagoon and stream for fishing and recreation during high water).
18 Compare 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 15 (“Where the state has acquired ownership
of a waterway as an incident of statehood, its management and disposition of those rights is
subject to the public trust doctrine . . . .”), with id. at 15–24 (discussing many early cases
recognizing public commercial and recreation use rights in Oregon waters without regard to
bed ownership).
19 See supra notes 7, 17 and accompanying text; infra Part III.
20 Weise, 3 Or. at 451.
21 The state has established ownership of just 12 river segments and fewer than 100 of the
state’s thousands of lakes. Or. Dep’t of State Lands, Waterway Authorizations, Waterway
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about bed ownership.22 Therefore, by limiting ancillary public rights to use
bedlands and adjacent uplands to waterways with state-owned beds, the
2005 opinion failed to appreciate the scope of public navigation rights
recognized since the 1800s.23 Neither early nor modern cases on public water
use rights turned on bed ownership. And the PTD is not based exclusively on
bed ownership, but instead is based largely on public navigation rights from
the “common highways” language in the Statehood Act of 1859 (reflecting
the language of the Northwest Ordinance of 178724) as well as the states’ long
recognition of public ownership of water.25
The wealth of early Oregon case law protecting broad public rights in
navigable waters, including ancillary rights, also suggests that the PTD has
become a background principle of state property law. The United States
Supreme Court has explained that a state does not owe constitutional
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment when it
regulates private property consistent with background principles of state
property law.26 Justice Scalia once questioned whether customary public
rights to use Oregon’s ocean beaches are actually a background principle of

Navigability, http://www.oregon.gov/DSL/ NAV/waterway_navigability_index.shtml (last visited
Feb. 18, 2012) (providing links to lists of rivers, creeks, sloughs, and lakes that the state has
determined are publicly owned).
22 In 1995, the Oregon Legislature established a detailed administrative process under which
the State Land Board may assert state ownership of submerged or submersible lands. OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 274.402–274.412 (2007); see Or. Dep’t of State Lands, supra note 21.
23 See infra Parts III, IV.A.
24 Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, 1 U.S.C. LV, LVII (2006) (part
of the Organic Laws of the United States of America); see also Brusco Towboat Co. v. State, 589
P. 2d 712, 718 (Or. 1978) (en banc); Port of Portland v. Reeder, 280 P.2d 324, 334–35, 338 (Or.
1955) (en banc); Winston Bros. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 62 P.2d 7, 9 (Or. 1936); Anderson v.
Columbia Contract Co., 184 P. 240, 243 (Or. 1919); Corvalis & E. R. Co. v. Benson, 121 P. 418,
422 (Or. 1912) (“The state, however, cannot abdicate or grant away the other element of its title
to tidelands—the jus publicum, or public authority over them. This is the dominion of
government or sovereignty in the state, by which it prevents any use of lands bordering on the
navigable waters within the state which will materially interfere with navigation and commerce
thereon.”); Johnson v. Jeldness, 167 P. 798, 799 (Or. 1917) (“Section 2 of the act of Congress
approved February 14, 1859, admitting the state of Oregon into the Union, … [guarantees that
on] ‘rivers and waters, and all the navigable waters of said state, shall be common highways and
forever free, as well as to the inhabitants of said state as to all other citizens of the United
States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor.’ This section is declarative and
preservative of the jus publicum including the public right of navigation and fishery.” (quoting
Act of Feb. 14, 1859 (Oregon Statehood Act), ch. 33, § 2, 11 Stat. 383)); Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or.
408, 412 (1877) (“The grantees of the state took the land subject to every easement growing out
of the right of navigation inherent in the public.”); Office of the Attorney General, State of
Oregon, Opinion No. 6861, 35 Or. Op. Atty. Gen. 844, 847–48 (Sept. 17, 1971); Dunning, supra
note 6, § 30.04.
25 See In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1087 (Or. 1924) (announcing that “[n]o one has any
property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct” and that Oregon law “plainly declares that all
waters within the state from all sources of water supply belong to the public”); see also
Dunning, supra note 6, § 30.04.
26 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (explaining that the state can
regulate property consistent with background principles of nuisance and property law without
owing constitutional compensation).
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Oregon property law.27 But since 1869, the Oregon Supreme Court
recognized paramount public rights in all navigable-in-fact waters, even
those with privately owned beds.28 In 1912, the state supreme court
explained that “[t]he right of the state so to regulate the use of tidelands as
not materially to impede the public right of navigation is a constant factor in
every title relating to such land, but regulation is not confiscation.”29 The
next year, in 1913, Governor Oswald West and the legislature again declared
all Oregon tidelands “public highways” based upon their longstanding use for
travel along the rugged coast.30 The modern Oregon Supreme Court declared
that customary rights to use Oregon beaches are background principles of
state property law burdening private land titles.31 Consequently, Oregon
courts should recognize that public water use rights are also background
principles and a defense against compensation claims because the Oregon
Supreme Court has consistently upheld these public rights since
early statehood. 32

27 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “a State may not deny rights protected under the Federal Constitution . . . by
invoking nonexistent rules of state substantive law”).
28 See supra note 17 and accompanying text; infra Part III (discussing Oregon Supreme
Court opinions recognizing public rights to navigate, fish, engage in commerce, and recreate on
waters overlying privately owned beds).
29 Corvallis & E. R. Co., 121 P. at 426; accord Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458–
460 (1892) (upholding the state’s conveyance of a tract of tidelands and navigable waters to a
railroad but explaining that the state could not abdicate the jus publicum or duty to protect
public rights of navigation, fishing, and commerce).
30 Act of Feb. 13, 1913, ch. 47, 1913 Or. Laws 80, 80 (“The shore of the Pacific Ocean,
between ordinary high tide and extreme low tide, and from the Columbia River on the north to
the Oregon and California State line on the south . . . is hereby declared a public highway and
shall forever remain open as such to the public.”); see KATHRYN A. STRATON, OR. STATE PARKS &
RECREATION BRANCH, OREGON’S BEACHES: A BIRTHRIGHT PRESERVED 10–11 (1977); Or. State
Archives,
Oregon Blue Book: Notable Oregonians: Oswald West—Governor,
http://bluebook.state.or.us/notable/notwest.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (describing how,
after recovering 900,000 acres of school trust lands fraudulently acquired by speculators,
Governor West lobbied for legislation halting conveyances of tidelands); Or. Pub. Broad.,
Oregon Experience: The Beach Bill, http://www.opb.org/programs/oregonexperience
archive/beachbill/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (providing links to a documentary and timeline of
Oregon’s landmark 1967 Beach Bill, ch. 601, 1967 Or. Laws 1448 codified at OR. REV. STAT
§ 390.605–390.770 (2011)).
31 Oregon Statehood Act, ch. 33, § 2, 11 Stat. 383 (1859). The Act incorporated language
from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 declaring that “all the navigable waters . . . shall be
common highways and forever free.” Id.
32 See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 460 (Or. 1993) (“Because the
administrative rules and ordinances here do not deny to dry sand area owners all economically
viable use of their land and because ‘the proscribed use interests’ asserted by plaintiffs were not
part of plaintiffs’ title to begin with, they withstand plaintiffs’ facial challenge to their validity under
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1027 (1992))); Dodd v. Hood River Cnty., 855 P.2d 608, 614 n.12, 617 (Or. 1993) (en banc)
(denying landowner claims of regulatory takings based on a county forest zoning ordinance,
explaining that the zoning designation did not deprive landowners of all economically viable
uses of their property because the ordinance allowed for “numerous forest and
agricultural uses”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1925112

TOJCI.BLUMM.DOC

382

4/3/2012 12:50 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 42:375

This Article maintains that Oregon case law, statutes, and AG opinions
support a comprehensive Oregon PTD that protects public rights to use
water, wildlife, ocean beaches, and associated uplands. Part II explains how
the 2005 AG opinion unnecessarily confined the PTD to navigable-for-title
waters while identifying a new category of public use rights in waters with
privately owned beds. Part III shows how since the early 1900s, the Oregon
Supreme Court has upheld public rights to use all navigable-in-fact waters
for recreational purposes, regardless of bed ownership. Part IV proceeds to
describe how the courts, the legislature, and executive officials have
consistently recognized broad public rights in Oregon’s waters, wildlife, and
beaches based on public navigation rights, sovereign ownership of water and
wildlife, and custom. The Article concludes that Oregon’s courts and the AG
should unify these common law concepts under the state PTD to consistently
recognize public rights in state-owned natural resources.33
II. THE 2005 ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION
In 2005, controversy surrounding the determination of state bed
ownership along segments of the John Day River, combined with highprofile trespass suits involving fishermen’s associations, prompted Oregon’s
Treasurer to request an AG opinion on the scope of public rights in Oregon’s
navigable waters.34 In the ensuing opinion, Oregon AG Hardy Myers
acknowledged public rights to recreate on both navigable-for-title waters
with state-owned beds, and navigable-in-fact waters with privately owned
beds.35 The AG relied on the Oregon Supreme Court’s recognition of public
rights to use all navigable-in-fact waterways for recreational purposes
regardless of bed ownership in the 1918 decision of Guilliams v. Beaver Lake
Club36 and the 1936 decision of Luscher v. Reynolds.37 However, the opinion
confined the PTD to navigable-for-title waters, creating confusion by
announcing a new category of public rights, apparently separate from the
PTD, on navigable-in-fact waters with privately owned beds: the so-called
“public use” doctrine.38

33 See infra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing two 1959 AG opinions following
1918 and 1936 Oregon Supreme Court cases, and recognizing broad public rights to use all
navigable-in-fact waters for commerce and recreation based on public ownership of water and
wildlife); infra Part V.
34 JANET C. NEUMAN, OREGON WATER LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATER
AND WATER RIGHTS IN OREGON § 8.0, at 222–23, 233–35 (2011) (describing recreational
navigability in Oregon and the genesis of the 2005 AG Opinion).
35 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 15–17, 24 (recognizing public rights to recreate in state
waters under the PTD, and in all navigable waters under the “public use” doctrine).
36 175 P. 437, 442 (Or. 1918).
37 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936); 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 24.
38 See 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 24 (“Guilliams and Luscher are the Oregon
Supreme Court’s most recent opinions on the public use doctrine in Oregon. The public’s
common law right to use a waterway independent of state ownership is established by the line
of cases culminating in these decisions.”).
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The AG’s public use doctrine was a consequence of a failure to
appreciate the breadth of the PTD, defining “navigable-for-public-use”
waterways as those “navigable-in-fact” waters “open to public use under
Oregon law, even if the bed is privately-owned.”39 Although Oregon courts
had never distinguished public rights based on state or private bed
ownership,40 the AG erected this wholly new “public use” doctrine protecting
public rights to use waters for purposes like those protected under the PTD,
including commerce, fishing, and recreation. The new doctrine applied to
“navigable-for-public-use” waters with privately owned beds.41 But the
opinion failed to distinguish public rights protected under the public use
doctrine from those protected by the PTD.42 The 2005 opinion explained that
the public can use navigable-for-public-use waters to hunt, fish, boat, bathe,
and “do other things incidental to the public use of water,”43 suggesting that,
like under the PTD, protected public uses can evolve over time.44 By
identifying this new category of public rights protected under the so-called
public use doctrine, the opinion created confusion about public rights to
navigate, fish, hunt, and recreate on most of Oregon’s lakes and small rivers,
where bed ownership is often unclear.45
On navigable-for-title waters that are clearly subject to the PTD, the AG
opinion advised that all activities “not otherwise unlawful” are permissible
below the ordinary high water mark on waters, including any use of stateowned beds and banks for recreational purposes.46 However, for waters
overlying privately owned beds, the AG noted that some lawful activities
below the ordinary high water mark may be trespasses outside the scope of
the public use doctrine if the public “materially injure[s] or interfere[s]” with
landowner rights.47 Without giving any examples, the 2005 opinion advised
that proscribed uses were those “unreasonably interfering” with landowner
rights, supplying law enforcement little guidance as to the scope of
permissible activities when members of the public may lawfully access
39
40

Id. at 2. This Article refers to navigable-in-fact waters as navigable-for-public-use waters.
See id. (defining “[p]ublic rights to use” arising from either state ownership or the public

use doctrine as “navigation, commerce, recreation or fisheries” in one common definition).
41 Id. at 22, 24 (describing how the Guilliams court recognized that “public use for
‘commerce’ includes fishing and pleasure boating” (citing Guilliams, 175 P. at 441–42)).
42 Compare id. at 15 (describing the state’s requirement to protect public uses under the
PTD), with id. at 22 (describing the uses protected under the public use doctrine).
43 Id. at 23 (quoting ROBERT Y. THORNTON, 29 BIENNIAL REPORT AND OPINIONS OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF OREGON 296, 296–97 (1959)); id. at 23–24 (citing THORNTON,
supra, at 311–12) (advising the Oregon Military Department that it could not lease departmentowned lands to a private hunting club because the public has the right to hunt and fish on
waters that were navigable-in-fact, regardless of ownership of the beds of the waterway).
44 See generally Or. Dep’t of State Lands, supra note 21 (explaining which waters have been
declared navigable-for-title by the Department or the courts in linked pages).
45 See supra notes 21–22, infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
46 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 2.
47 See id. at 25 (quoting Trullinger v. Howe, 97 P. 548, 550 (Or. 1908), modified, 99 P. 880
(Or. 1909) and explaining that in 1908, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that “a logger did not
have the right to operate dams or reservoirs on a stream above a riparian landowner’s property
for the purpose of floating logs, if that operation ‘materially injure[s] or interfere[s] with the
riparian owner’s use of the waters for power purposes’”).
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navigable waters.48 Uncertain public rights on state waters pose problems
because landowners may erroneously exclude members of the public from
floatable waterways, and demand for recreational uses of waters is on
the rise.49
Unlike the 2005 opinion, the Oregon Supreme Court has never
articulated narrower public rights to use waters with privately owned beds
for navigation or recreation, so the state should not have to determine bed
ownership to determine the scope of public rights in waters.50 Public
ownership of water and the public highways language of the Oregon
Statehood Act support the consistent protection of public navigation rights
in all waters navigable-for-public-use.51 As explained in Part III, these ideas
were the basis of early state common law on the subject, which the Oregon
Supreme Court has consistently followed when recognizing public rights to
use waters for commerce, navigation, fishing, and recreation, regardless of
bed ownership.52 Consequently, the AG should revise the 2005 opinion to
recognize that the PTD burdens all waters in Oregon and protects public
rights to use water for trust purposes, subject, of course, to reasonable
state regulation.53
When ownership of the bed of a waterway is unclear, and the extent of
public rights below ordinary high water mark are therefore uncertain, the
AG advised members of the public to “(1) file a Petition for Navigability
Study that asks the Board to conduct a formal study and issue a final
declaration; (2) file an action asking a court to determine whether the
particular waterway is state-owned; or (3) decide [whether it is worth] . . .

48
49

Id. at 28.
See, e.g., Nw. Steelheader’s Ass’n v. Simantel, 112 P.3d 383, 385–86 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)

(describing a landowner’s counterclaim for trespass when the public plaintiffs sought a
declaration of navigability for recreational fishing on the John Day River); see also
OregonBusinessPlan.org, Tourism & Hospitality, http://www.oregonbusinessplan.org/IndustryClusters/About-Oregons-Industry-Clusters/Tourism-Hospitality.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2012)
(noting that tourism will continue to play an important role in Oregon’s future and that the
industry saw a 20% increase between 2003 and 2009).
50 See infra Part III; see, e.g., Weise, 3 Or. 445, 450–51 (1869) (recognizing public rights to
float logs on navigable waters, even those over privately owned beds); Felger v. Robinson, 3 Or.
455, 458 (1869) (upholding public rights to float logs in streams with privately owned beds that
were only seasonally navigable); Shaw, 10 Or. 371, 371, 382–83 (1882) (affirming an injunction
against a riparian sawmill owner for diverting water in a manner that interfered with log floats
on the Tualatin River); Johnson, 167 P. 798, 799 (Or. 1917) (rejecting a littoral landowner’s
attempt to exclude the public and establish an exclusive fishery because the Oregon Statehood
Act, ch. 33, § 2, 11 Stat. 383 (1859), recognized a public fishery); Guilliams, 175 P. 437, 441–42
(Or. 1918) (affirming public recreational rights on navigable streams and lagoons with privately
owned beds); Luscher, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936) (ruling that the bed of Blue Lake was
privately owned in a breach of warranty decision, but explaining that the public had
recreational rights on the lake under Guilliams).
51 See Dunning, supra note 6, § 30.04 (describing public ownership of water as a source of
the PTD in Montana, Idaho, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming, and noting similar
statutory language in OR. REV. STAT. § 537.110 (2006)).
52 See infra Part III (describing Oregon Supreme Court cases recognizing public rights to
use all waters regardless of bed ownership).
53 See infra notes 121–27 and accompanying text.
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tak[ing] the risk that [the] use will be a trespass.”54 This advice is neither
practical nor in keeping with the spirit of the Oregon Supreme Court’s
consistent and broad protection of public recreational rights in navigablefor-public-use waters, regardless of bed ownership.55 First, although Oregon
has established a process for declaring bed ownership, the procedure is
cumbersome, time-consuming, and rarely invoked, meaning that ownership
confusion is likely to persist for decades.56 Second, case law and several
earlier AG opinions reveal that the Oregon PTD burdens all state waters,
presumes the validity of public uses, and requires landowners to bear the
burden of establishing that a waterway is not useful for public boating,
bathing, fishing, hunting, or other uses.57 Consequently, the PTD should not,
as the 2005 AG Opinion concluded, require the public to either bear the
burden of proving bed ownership or risk trespass liability.58
As long ago as 1918, in Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, the Oregon
Supreme Court recognized recreational use as a protected public use of
navigable waters, even those with privately owned beds.59 The court
explicitly affirmed the Guilliams holding two decades later in 1936, in
Luscher v. Reynolds.60 Then, in a 1959 opinion, the AG recognized that
irrespective of bed ownership, public rights to fish and hunt in all navigablefor-public-use waters are “free and common to all the citizens of the state”
and that, absent statutory authority, the Oregon National Guard could not
lease a portion of Slusher Lake to provide a private hunting club with
exclusive waterfowl shooting privileges.61
54

2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 27–28.
See supra text accompanying note 40; infra Part III.
56 See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (describing Oregon’s processes for
determining navigability and bed ownership); see also Matthew Preusch, Oregon River Rights
Still in Question as Montana Governor Signs Access Bill, OREGONIAN, Apr. 15, 2009,
http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2009/04/oregon_river_rights_still_in_q.html
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (“Currently the state has a bulky, contentious, river-by-river system
for determining whether a river is ‘navigable’ . . . .”).
57 See infra Part III.
58 See infra text accompanying notes 110–20 (describing the Oregon Supreme Court’s broad
view of the PTD concerning public navigational rights); see also Mont. Coal. for Stream Access,
Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984) (rejecting a “pleasure-boat” or “commercial
use” test of the scope of the PTD as unduly restrictive because the Montana Constitution
declares that “[a]ll surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the boundaries
of the state are the property of the state for the use of its people” (quoting MONT. CONST. art. IX,
§ 3(3) (2011)); Ark. River Rights Comm. v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, 126 S.W.3d 738, 743–44
(Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (ruling that inundated lands with privately owned beds were navigable for
recreational use, explaining: “We disagree that the concept of navigability for the purpose of
determining the public’s right to use water is that static. Although navigability to fix ownership
of a river bed or riparian rights is determined as of the date of the state’s entry into the union,
navigability for other purposes may arise later.”).
59 Guilliams, 175 P. 437, 441–42 (Or. 1918) (explaining that “we fail to see why commerce
should not be construed to include the use of boats and vessels for the purposes of pleasure”).
60 Luscher, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936) (describing Guilliams as “well-considered”).
61 THORNTON, supra note 43, at 311–12 (advising that the Oregon Military Department could
not lease department-owned lands to a private hunting club because the public has the right to
hunt and fish on waters that were navigable in fact, regardless of ownership of the beds of the
waterway); see also THORNTON, supra note 43, at 296–97 (affirming that the Oregon State Marine
55

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1925112

TOJCI.BLUMM.DOC

386

4/3/2012 12:50 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 42:375

The 1959 opinion explained that state agencies cannot issue leases
interfering with public use rights without authorization from the state
legislature because doing so would “transform[] a public right into a
monopoly.”62 The AG recognized that the state could regulate hunting,
fishing, and other recreational activities in its sovereign capacity but, like
private landowners, the state could not exclude the public from using
navigable waters for recreational purposes when acting in its proprietary
capacity.63 Consistent with the 1959 opinion and a wealth of Oregon case law
discussed in the next Part, the AG should revise the 2005 opinion to
recognize that the Oregon PTD protects all reasonable uses of navigable-forpublic-use waters. In short, the PTD is not only associated with public land
ownership, but also provides public usufructuary rights in all
navigable waters.
III. PUBLIC WATER USE RIGHTS UNDER THE OREGON PTD
Oregon courts should recognize that, as in other states,64 the state’s
traditional PTD protecting public rights to navigate, fish, hunt, and conduct
commerce may evolve to protect new public uses, just as the Oregon PTD
evolved in the early 1900s to protect recreation in waters floatable only by
small craft.65 The 1859 Oregon Statehood Act required the state to protect
public navigation rights, including language from the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787 that declared “all the navigable waters . . . shall be common
highways and forever free.”66 After statehood, the Oregon Supreme Court

Board could promulgate boating regulations governing the use of Oswego Lake, even though
the lakebed was privately owned).
Oswego Lake provides a useful case study of the potential effects of the PTD. The lake is nearly
surrounded by private landowners, although there are adjacent public lands. See, e.g., Oswego
Lake Forum, Q&A on Oswego Lake Accessibility with the Oregon Department of State Lands,
http://lakeaccess.wordpress.com/about (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (colloquy between Todd
Prager, Lake Oswego Planning Commissioner, and Jeff Kroft, Senior Policy Specialist, Oregon
Department of State Lands). For years, however, the corporation managing the lake has
assumed that there are no public rights to the lake. See id. Yet, the public’s ownership of the
water in the lake means that the corporation has no right to exclude the public from recreational
use of the lake. Id.
62 THORNTON, supra note 43, at 312.
63 Id. (“It is our view then that the public easement for the purposes of navigation and
commerce includes the right to hunt and that the state cannot grant an exclusive right to hunt
on Slusher Lake.”).
64 See Dunning, supra note 6, § 31.01–.02 (describing traditional public rights of navigation,
commerce, and fishing, as well as modern recognition of public recreational rights).
65 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 1 (“Federal and state law limit the discretion of the
state to alienate its ownership [of the beds of navigable-for-title waters], to the extent that doing
so would interfere with the public use of the waterway for navigation, commerce, recreation or
fisheries.”); see supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing public rights to hunt
in Oregon).
66 Oregon Statehood Act, ch. 33, § 2, 11 Stat. 383 (1859); see, e.g., Johnson, 167 P. 798, 799
(Or. 1917) (rejecting a littoral landowner’s attempt to claim an exclusive fishery because the
Oregon Statehood Act established a public right of fishery (citing Oregon Statehood Act, § 2, 11
Stat. 383)); Anderson v. Columbia Contract Co. 184 P. 240, 243 (Or. 1919) (“The Columbia river
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repeatedly invoked this “public highways” language when recognizing public
rights to navigate, fish, and conduct commerce in all navigable waters, even
those with privately owned beds.67 Later, in the early 1900s, the Oregon
Supreme Court recognized public rights to recreate in all navigable-in-fact
waters, regardless of bed ownership.68 This Part describes how, building on
the Statehood Act, several nineteenth century Oregon Supreme Court
decisions laid the groundwork for a broad PTD recognizing public rights to
conduct commerce, navigate, fish, and recreate in all Oregon waters capable
of supporting these public uses.

A. Public Rights of Navigation, Fishing, and Commerce
In back-to-back cases in 1869, the Oregon Supreme Court defined
public rights to conduct commerce, fish, and navigate in navigable-in-fact
waters. First, in Weise v. Smith,69 the court affirmed a trial court ruling that
loggers did not trespass by floating logs over privately owned beds of the
Tualatin River to sawmills in Oregon City.70 The court held that a “stream . . .
generally useful for floating boats, rafts, or logs, for any useful purpose of
agriculture and trade, though it be private property, and not strictly
navigable, is subject to public use as a passageway.”71 The Weise decision
explained that the public had the right to use waters that were exposed
privately owned beds below the high water mark and, when necessary, even
associated uplands.72 The court expressly recognized that the loggers had the

is a navigable stream, and as such is a common highway ‘and forever free.’ This right is a public
one, and it is not only given by the common law, but is preserved by the statute admitting the
state of Oregon into the Union.”) (citing Jeldness, 167 P. at 799).
67 Felger v. Robinson, 3 Or. 455, 455, 458 (1869); Shaw, 10 Or. 371, 375 (1882) (“At the
common law . . . navigable rivers . . . are denominated public highways, and the public have
only an easement therein for the purposes of transportation and commercial intercourse.”).
68 See supra notes 36–37; infra Part III.B and accompanying text (discussing the Guilliams
and Luscher decisions).
69 3 Or. 445 (1869).
70 Id. at 450–51.
71 Id. at 450. The Weise court rejected the tidal test of navigability inherited from English
common law in favor of the navigable-in-fact test after describing the navigable-in-fact test as
the “settled law of the United States” adapted to its geographical conditions. Id. at 448–49. The
early Oregon Supreme Court did not seem to recognize log floats as sufficient evidence of
commerce to establish navigability for title purposes. See, e.g., Shaw, 10 Or. at 375–76
(explaining that streams “navigable in fact for boats, vessels, or lighters” are “public highways”
where “the public have an easement for the purposes of navigation and commerce, but the title
of the subjacent soil . . . is in the riparian owner, subject to the superior rights of the public to
use it for the purposes of transportation and trade”). However, the modern Oregon Supreme
Court has recognized that waters capable of supporting log floats are navigable-for-title,
meaning that the state acquired ownership of the beds of these waters at statehood. See Nw.
Steelheaders Ass’n v. Simantel, 112 P.3d 383, 385, 392 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming that
segments of the John Day River were navigable-for-title based on evidence of log floats in
early statehood).
72 Weise, 3 Or. at 450–52 (explaining that “[n]o person has a right to permanently obstruct
the channel of such stream by a boom across it, though he may do so temporarily, if necessary
for the useful navigation of the stream,” and commenting that “[i]f there had been no
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right to construct temporary booms on privately owned uplands adjacent to
navigable-in-fact waters when necessary to facilitate navigation.73 In this first
case on public rights in navigable waters, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld
public rights of navigation and commerce on all floatable waters, regardless
of bed ownership.74
Second, in the companion case of Felger v. Robinson,75 the court
recognized the public’s right to float logs to market on waters over privately
owned beds that were navigable only during the spring freshet.76 The
supreme court affirmed a lower court decision in favor of the loggers, but
emphasized that a jury should decide whether public use of waters was
reasonable based on the facts because under state law, despite private bed
ownership, the public has superior rights to navigate for purposes of
transportation and trade, and “any stream . . . is navigable on whose waters
logs or timbers can be floated to market, and that they are public highways
for that purpose.”77 The court also stated that “it is not necessary that they
be navigable the whole year for that purpose” to constitute navigable
streams.78 Thus, in its earliest rulings on public navigation rights in 1869, the
Oregon Supreme Court ratified public rights to use all waterways, even
those with privately owned beds that are intermittently suitable for
public use.79
A little more than a decade later, in its 1882 decision of Shaw v. Oswego
Iron Co.,80 the Oregon Supreme Court continued to emphasize this broad
protection of public use rights, explicitly affirming Weise and Felger.81 In
Shaw, the court upheld an injunction against an iron smelter for diverting
water in a manner that interfered with log floats on the Tualatin River,82
explaining that even when riparian landowners own to the middle of a
stream, their rights are “subordinate to the public easement” and “subject to
the superior rights of the public to use [the water] for the purposes of

necessity for fastening the boom to the plaintiff’s land . . . it would have been a trespass”
(citations omitted)).
73 Id. at 450–51 (determining that the jury should determine whether public navigational
uses are unreasonable, including whether loggers failed to remove booms within a
reasonable time).
74 Id. at 450.
75 3 Or. 455 (1869).
76 Id. at 457–58 (“We hold the law to be, that any stream in this state is navigable on whose
waters logs or timbers can be floated to market, and that they are public highways for that
purpose; and that it is not necessary that they be navigable the whole year for that purpose to
constitute them such.”).
77 Id. at 458; see also Shaw, 10 Or. 371, 375–76 (1882) (describing superior public navigation
rights on navigable-in-fact waters, even those with privately owned beds).
78 Felger, 3 Or. at 458.
79 See Weise, 3 Or. at 450; Felger, 3 Or. at 455, 458.
80 10 Or. 371, 382 (1882).
81 Id. at 382 (noting that Weise and Felger were consistent with developments of the public
navigation right in Maine, New York, and Wisconsin and citing Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552, 560–62,
564 (1855); Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 459 (1866); Diedrich v. Nw. Union Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 248,
266 (1877)).
82 Id. at 374–75.
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transportation and trade.”83 The Oregon court was hardly unique in
recognizing paramount public navigation rights based on this public
highways language from the Northwest Ordinance.84
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Oregon Supreme Court
recognized the broad public navigation rights in waters with state-owned
beds, as well as those with private beds.85 In addition, the court emphasized
that when exercising navigation rights, members of the public cannot
damage riparian land or privately owned beds.86 Thus, in early statehood, the
court laid the foundation of a broad PTD by establishing public rights to use
all navigable waters for purposes of navigation and commerce, regardless of
bed ownership, while also recognizing that the public cannot unreasonably
interfere with landowner rights.87
Then, in its 1893 decision of Shively v. Bowlby,88 the United States
Supreme Court affirmed an Oregon Supreme Court decision that the PTD
burdened both tidelands and navigable waters, explaining that the state
owns these resources in its sovereign capacity in “a public trust for the
benefit of the whole community, to be freely used by all for navigation and
fishery.”89 The Shively Court ruled that, even if the state conveyed interests
in tidelands to private landowners, the title remained “subject [] to the
paramount right of navigation.”90 The Court observed that private title or “jus
privatum, whether in the King or in a subject, is held subject to the public
right, jus publicum, of navigation and fishing.”91 In the early twentieth
century, the Oregon Supreme Court continued to recognize that the jus
publicum burdens all navigable waters, even those with privately owned
83 Id. at 375–76, 382. The court did emphasize that the public does not have a right to
damage riparian land. See id. at 375–76 (discussing the public right to use navigable streams for
navigation and commerce, but title of the subjacent soil belongs to the riparian owner).
84 See Dunning, supra note 6, § 30.06 (describing the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 as a basis
of the PTD in states like Wisconsin, Missouri, and Mississippi, and noting similar language in the
statehood acts of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Alaska). Arkansas has also recognized
that the PTD is based on the “public highways” language derived from the Northwest
Ordinance. Id. § 30.06(c).
85 Weise, 3 Or. 445, 450 (1869) (recognizing public rights to float logs on navigable-in-fact
waters with privately owned beds); Felger, 3 Or. 455, 458 (1869) (recognizing public rights to
float logs in seasonally navigable streams with privately owned beds); Shaw, 10 Or. 371, 372, 383
(1882) (enjoining a riparian sawmill owner from diverting water in a way that interfered with
log floats); Johnson, 167 P. 798, 799 (Or. 1917) (rejecting a littoral landowner’s attempt to
exclude the public to establish an exclusive fishery).
86 Weise, 3 Or. at 451 (“If he has a right to meddle with the bank, it is only an incidental one.
Although the riparian owner has an absolute right to enjoy his land, . . . the [public] has an
absolute right . . . to navigate the stream. Neither one can justly deprive the other of
his rights.”).
87 Id. at 450–51 (noting that “[i]f there had been no necessity for fastening the boom to the
plaintiff’s land . . . it would have been a trespass”).
88 152 U.S. 1, 54–55, 58 (1893), aff’d sub nom. Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P. 154 (Or. 1892)
(holding that title to tidelands purchased from the state continues to be subject to paramount
public navigation rights).
89 Shively, 152 U.S. at 16 (quoting passages of Lord Hale’s treatise).
90 Id. at 52–54.
91 Id. at 13–14, 16, 25 (citing Lord Hale, English common law decisions, and a Virginia
attorney general opinion).
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beds, and soon ruled that it protects recreation within the scope of public
navigation rights.92

B. Public Recreational Rights
In 1918, Oregon became one of the first states to recognize recreation
as commerce protected under the public navigation easement.93 Most states
now recognize recreation as a public use purpose of the PTD, which burdens
all navigable-in-fact waters capable of floatation by small craft.94 Although
the Oregon Supreme Court has not addressed public use rights in navigable
waters since the mid-1930s, the principle of broad public rights in all
navigable waters regardless of bed ownership was well established long ago
in Oregon law.
First, in Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, the 1918 Oregon Supreme Court
upheld a trial court ruling that a landowner could not build a flood control
dam that would interfere with public use of a nearby lagoon for recreation
during high water.95 The court also affirmed an injunction preventing the
landowner from maintaining a wire fence across the stream to prevent the
public from fishing and recreating, even though the landowner owned the
streambed.96 Following the Minnesota Supreme Court decision of Lamprey v.
Metcalf,97 the Guilliams court recognized broad public rights to recreate in
navigable-for-public-use waters, even those overlying private beds,
not merely navigable-for-title waters acquired by the state upon admission to
the Union.98

92
93

See infra Part III.B.
See infra notes 95–113 (discussing the Guilliams decision). The Minnesota Supreme Court

first recognized public rights to use all waters for recreational purposes, regardless of bed
ownership in 1893, in Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893) (“Certainly, we do
not see why boating or sailing for pleasure should not be considered navigation, as well as
boating for mere pecuniary profit. . . . To hand over all these lakes to private ownership, under
any old or narrow test of navigability, would be a great wrong upon the public for all time, the
extent of which cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated.”).
94 See, e.g., generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’

Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological
Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 72–75 (2010) (describing public use rights in recreational
waters in North Dakota, Oklahoma, California, Oregon, and Alaska); Robin Kundis Craig, A
Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classification of States, Property
Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 14, 18 & n.99 (2007) (explaining that
the PTD includes recreational purposes in Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Ohio, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Vermont).
95 175 P. 437, 443 (Or. 1918). Although the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
order enjoining the landowner from building a dam, the court modified the order to allow
landowner to construct the dam if he could avoid interfering with public uses by constructing a
channel. Id. The trial court enjoined the landowner from constructing another dam because the
first dam he constructed washed out during a storm. Id. The facts of the case involved riparians
with rowboats, but it was unclear whether they were for private recreational use or for
commercial use for tourists. Id. at 438.
96 Id. at 442–43.
97 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893); see supra note 93.
98 Guilliams, 175 P. at 442 (quoting Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143).
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In Guilliams, the court did not consider whether the streambeds at
issue were navigable-for-title because the parties “conceded . . . that such
title is in the riparian proprietors.”99 But the court explained that “[w]hatever
may be the title to the bed of such streams or bodies of water . . . they do not
own the water itself, but only the use of it as it flows past their property.”100
Even though the riparian landowner owned the streambed, the court ruled
that the stream was impressed with a public navigation easement, so the
public had a right to recreate in rowboats, engage in commerce with
scows,101 and fish for trout during the summer months.102
The Guilliams court reasoned that recreation was a form of commerce
within the scope of the public navigation easement, explaining:
Even confining the definition of navigability, as many courts do, to suitability
for the purposes of trade and commerce, we fail to see why commerce should
not be construed to include the use of boats and vessels for the purposes of
pleasure. The vessel carrying a load of passengers to a picnic is in law just as
103
much engaged in commerce as the one carrying grain or other merchandise.

Thus, the Oregon court was a pioneer in recognizing recreation as
commerce guaranteed under the public navigation easement, now the rule in
the many states that recognize the PTD protects public rights to navigate,
fish, and recreate in all navigable waters, regardless of bed ownership.104
Following the 1889 Shaw decision,105 Guilliams upheld public rights to
use waters over privately owned beds for recreational purposes, even
though not suitable for large-scale commerce, so long as they were capable
of floatation by small craft.106 Relying again on Lamprey, the court explained

99
100
101

Id. at 441.
Id.
Id. at 438, 442 (mentioning use of the stream by scows). Scows are flat-bottomed boats

with square ends used to haul freight. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2038 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 2002).
102 Guilliams, 175 P. at 438, 442 (discussing use of the stream for trout fishing during
the summer).
103 Id. at 441. It was unclear from the court’s decision whether the riparian landowners’
rowboats mentioned in Guilliams were for private use or commercial tourism, although tourism
was common near Oregon beaches at that time. See generally STRATON, supra note 30
(describing the history of public use of Oregon beaches); Or. Pub. Broad., Oregon Experience,
Timeline: The Beach Bill, http://www.opb.org/programs/oregonexperiencearchive/beachbill/
timeline.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (providing a timeline of the Beach Bill).
104 Guilliams, 175 P. at 441; see Dunning, supra note 6, § 32.03, 32.03(a) (describing how
many states first determined the scope of the PTD using a log floatation test, but since the mid19th century, over 10 states have adopted the so-called “pleasure boat” test, including Arkansas,
California, Idaho, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming). Professor Dunning could add Oregon to this list based on Guilliams, Luscher, and
the 2005 AG Opinion. See 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 1–3 (describing public rights to use
waters over privately owned beds for recreational purposes under the public use doctrine);
supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (describing the AG’s recognition of public rights to
use waters over privately owned beds for recreational purposes in Guilliams and Luscher).
105 See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text (discussing Shaw).
106 Guilliams, 175 P. at 439–42.
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that if waters “are capable of use for boating, even for pleasure, they are
navigable, within the reason and spirit of the common-law rule.”107 The court
emphasized that a riparian owner’s land title is “subject to the superior right
of the public to use the water for the purposes of transportation and
trade,”108 stating that “courts should not lightly consign [public highways] to
unrestricted private ownership.”109 Consequently, by 1918, the Oregon
Supreme Court recognized paramount public recreational rights in all waters
floatable by small craft.
The Guilliams court explained that the public navigation easement is
broad, and that protected public uses of waterways may change over time.110
The court again quoted the Minnesota Lamprey decision for the proposition
that public navigation easement protects an expansive range of navigational
and commercial uses, including “sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing,
skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and even city purposes,
cutting ice, and other public purposes which cannot now be enumerated or
even anticipated.”111 Landowners “do not own the water itself, but only the
use of it as it flows past their property.”112 As a consequence of public water
ownership and public navigation rights, the court followed Lamprey,
agreeing that landowners cannot interfere with public use of waters for
protected
purposes,
including
navigation,
fishing,
commerce,
and recreation.113
In its next decision on public recreational rights, the 1936 decision of
Luscher v. Reynolds, the Oregon Supreme Court continued to emphasize the
breadth of public rights in waters overlying privately owned beds.114 The case
centered on the extent of public rights to use Blue Lake, a small and popular
lake near Portland with privately owned beds.115 Affirming the lower court,
the court held that a seller did not breach his title warranty by conveying the
bed of Blue Lake because in fact he, and not the state, owned the lakebed.116
107
108
109

Id. at 442 (quoting Lamprey, 53 N.W. 1139, 1144 (Minn. 1893)).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 441. Interpreting language from the Statehood Act and Northwest Ordinance, the

court explained that in navigable waters, “the public has an easement for the purposes of
navigation and commerce, they being deemed public highways for such purposes.” Id. at 439–40.
110 Id. at 442 (quoting Lamprey, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143–44 (Minn. 1893)).
111 Id. (quoting Lamprey, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893)).
112 Id. at 441.
113 See id. at 442 (quoting Lamprey, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893)). The court explained
that “where actual navigability of the water exists, courts should not lightly consign them to
unrestricted private ownership. Whatever may be the title to the bed . . . [riparian landowners]
do not own the water itself, but only the use of it as it flows past their property.” Id. at 441.
114 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936) (recognizing public recreational rights in navigable-in-fact
waters, not only navigable-for-title waters, because “[t]here are hundreds of similar beautiful,
small inland lakes in this state well adapted for recreational purposes, but which will never be
used as highways of commerce in the ordinary acceptation of such terms”).
115 Id. at 1159, 1162 (determining that for Blue Lake, the “title to the bed is in the adjacent
owners, subject however to the superior right of the public to use the water for the purposes of
commerce and transportation”).
116 The buyer alleged that the seller failed to disclose that the state held title to the portion of
the bed of Blue Lake at issue, but the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that the seller validly
conveyed private title to the lakebed. Id. at 1161.
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The court explained that even though the lakebed was privately owned, the
lake was open for public recreational use because recreation is a form of
commerce within the scope of the public navigation easement.117 Describing
Guilliams as “well-considered,” the Luscher court explained that
“[r]egardless of the ownership of the bed, the public has the paramount right
to the use of the waters . . . for the purpose of transportation and
commerce,” including recreational boating.118 The court reiterated the
breadth of public recreational rights in all navigable-in-fact waters:
“Commerce” has a broad and comprehensive meaning. It is not limited to
navigation for pecuniary profit. A boat used for the transportation of pleasure
seeking passengers is, in a legal sense, as much engaged in commerce as is a
vessel transporting a shipment of lumber. There are hundreds of similar
beautiful, small inland lakes in this state well adapted for recreational
purposes, but which will never be used as highways of commerce in the
ordinary acceptation of such terms. . . . “To hand over all these lakes to private
ownership, under any old or narrow test of navigability, would be a great
wrong upon the public for all time, the extent of which cannot, perhaps, be
119
now even anticipated.”

Thus, in both Guilliams and Luscher, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized
public rights to recreate in all navigable-in-fact waters in Oregon and
anticipated that public uses of waterways would evolve over time.120
The term “public trust doctrine” was not widespread until Professor
Sax published his seminal article in 1970.121 Yet over thirty years before his
article, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized public recreational rights in
navigable-in-fact waters in its decisions of Guilliams and Luscher.122 As the
AG pointed out in his 2005 opinion, “[n]o cases decided since Guilliams and
Luscher contradict or erode their holdings.”123 In both decisions, the Oregon
Supreme Court recognized public rights in navigable-for-public-use waters
capable of recreation by small craft as public highways, invoking language
from the Oregon Statehood Act that was adopted from the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787.124 The Statehood Act stipulates that “[a]ll the navigable
waters . . . shall be common highways and forever free,”125 and the Oregon
Supreme Court recognized broad public rights on waters with private beds

117
118
119

Id. at 1162.
Id.
Id. (quoting Guilliams, 175 P. at 442).

120 For examples of other cases adopting the recreation-use test for navigability, see State v.
McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 664–65 (Ark. 1980) (adopting a recreational use test of navigability
under the PTD); Kelley ex rel. MacMullan v. Hallden, 214 N.W.2d 856, 862 & n.11, 863 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1974); J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 & n.4 (Utah 1982).
121 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Sax’s article).
122 Luscher, 56 P.2d at 1162 (quoting Guilliams, 175 P. at 442).
123 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 24.
124 See Luscher, 56 P.2d at 1162 (quoting Guilliams, 175 P. at 439) (describing navigable in

fact waters as “public highways”).
125 Oregon Statehood Act, ch. 33, § 2, 11 Stat. 383 (1859).
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in Weise, Felger, Shaw, Gullliams, and Luscher.126 These decisions
demonstrate that the Oregon PTD is not restricted to publicly owned lands
underlying navigable-for-title waters as the AG contended, but instead
springs from the “common highways” provision of the Statehood Act, the
public ownership of water, and the state’s common law duty to preserve the
jus publicum, to protect public rights to use all navigable-for-public-use
waters in the state.127
IV. PUBLIC RIGHTS IN WATER, WILDLIFE, BEACHES, AND UPLANDS UNDER
THE OREGON PTD
As explained above, considerable Oregon Supreme Court precedent
supports a broad PTD protecting public rights to use all navigable-in-fact
waters for navigation, commerce, fishing, and recreation, regardless of bed
ownership.128 In recent years, courts in other western states have applied the
PTD to the allocation of water rights.129 In addition, states like Montana, New
Jersey, and California have recognized that these public rights in natural
resources impose certain duties on the state, such as providing public
access, obtaining full market value for private use of public resources, and
maintaining PTD resources for future generations.130 Oregon courts should

126 See supra Part III.A; see also Johnson, 167 P. 798, 799 (Or. 1917) (rejecting a littoral
landowner’s attempt to claim an exclusive fishery because the Oregon Statehood Act
established a public right of fishery (citing Oregon Statehood Act, § 2, 11 Stat. 383 (1859))).
127 The AG did not address the effect of the language in the Oregon Statehood Act but noted
in his discussion of the PTD that the state’s duty to protect the public interest in waterways
“may derive from the terms of the Oregon Admissions Act;” although he again assumed that this
duty would apply only to state-owned waters. 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 15 & n.13.
128 See supra notes 50, 67–83, 92–94, 103, 105–08, 110–20 and accompanying text (discussing
judicial recognition of evolving public rights including navigation, fishing, commerce, and
recreation in all navigable-in-fact waters in Oregon).
129 Like the California Supreme Court in its Mono Lake decision, the Oregon Supreme Court
should recognize that the both the PTD and state water code impose a duty on the state to
“continuously supervise” water rights to protect public trust resources. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v.
Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty. (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied sub
nom. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); see also In re
Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 448 (Haw. 2000) (recognizing that the PTD burdens
water rights to protect public navigation, commerce, fishing, and recreation, including bathing,
swimming, boating, and scenic viewing and incorporates the precautionary principle); United
Plainsmen Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 462 (N.D. 1976)
(stating that “the Public Trust Doctrine requires, at a minimum, a determination of the potential
effect of the allocation of water on the present water supply and future water needs of this
State” to ensure that water rights are allocated and regulated “without detriment to the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining”). This principle also applies to wildlife. See infra
notes 209–14 and accompanying text (discussing Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FPL Group, 83
Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)).
130 Montana recognizes that its citizens have a fundamental right to a healthful environment,
and that the public can use all waters capable of recreational use for recreational purposes.
Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079, 1092 (Mont. 2007) (recognizing “[t]he
right to a clean and healthful environment constitutes a fundamental right” of all Montanans)
(citing MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3; Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236,
1246 (Mont. 1999)); Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170–71 (Mont.
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similarly recognize that as sovereign owner of the state’s water and wildlife,
the state has a trust duty to protect public uses of navigable waters and
wildlife by regulating water rights to maintain water flows, water quality,
and habitat.131 Further, Oregon courts should view the public’s rights to use
ocean beaches, which the Oregon Supreme Court upheld under the doctrine
of custom, as part of the state’s PTD.132

A. Water Rights
Oregon courts have yet to consider whether the PTD burdens existing
water rights,133 but they should acknowledge that the PTD requires the state
to manage water rights as public trustee based on the state’s longstanding
recognition of public ownership of water and the paramount public rights in
navigable-for-public-use waters. For decades, both the legislature and state
officials have recognized that public instream uses can impose limits on the
amount of water available for appropriation, but this recognition has not
slowed water consumption, and Oregon surface and groundwater levels
remain insufficient to support fish habitat and recreation during summer
months.134 In 2009, the legislature took note that surface water in the state
was almost completely appropriated in the summer and that groundwater
supplies have declined precipitously in some parts of the state.135 Because
1984) (recognizing that under the codification of public ownership of water in Article 9, Section
3 of the 1972 Constitution, “any surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be so
used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for nonrecreational
purposes”); Galt v. State Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987)
(explaining that “the public’s right to use the waters includes the right of use of the bed and
banks up to the high water mark even though the fee title in the land resides with the adjoining
landowners” (citing Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984);
Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984)). In New Jersey, the
PTD provides public access to privately owned beaches. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis
Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124 (N.J. 2005) (holding that a private beach club in an area with
no public beaches “must be available for use by the general public under the public trust
doctrine,” though it could charge a reasonable management fee); Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 721
(explaining that the PTD imposes a duty on the state of “continued supervision over the trust”
to maintain water and wildlife resources).
131 See infra Part IV.A–B (discussing sovereign water and wildlife ownership, as well as
common law and statutory efforts to protect these resources).
132 See infra Part IV.C (discussing public rights to use Oregon beaches as public highways).
133 See WaterWatch of Or., Inc. v. Water Res. Comm’n, 112 P.3d 443, 446, 453 (Or. Ct. App.
2005) (declining to consider whether the Water Resources Commission violated its public trust
duty by allowing groundwater withdrawals to deplete surface water flows, after concluding that
the Commission violated a statutory directive to maintain stream flows in quantities that it had
established as necessary for fish, wildlife, and recreation).
134 See generally Robert Davíd Pilz, Comment, At the Confluence: Oregon’s Instream Water
Rights Law in Theory and Practice, 36 ENVTL. L. 1383, 1395 (2006) (describing practical
limitations on Oregon’s instream water rights, including lack of enforcement resources, local
opposition, administrative obstacles, and challenges to instream transfers).
135 Act of Aug. 4, 2009, ch. 907, 2009 Or. Laws 3237, 3237 (“Whereas surface water is almost
completely allocated across Oregon during summer months, ground water levels have declined
precipitously in several areas and the hydrological connection between surface water and
ground water levels is significant; and [w]hereas Oregon needs to develop an integrated
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the prior appropriation system of water rights is based on the state’s
ownership of water,136 Oregon courts should acknowledge that the PTD
burdens all appropriated water rights, imposing an affirmative duty on the
state to maintain streamflows and water quality.137
Other western states like Idaho, New Mexico, South Dakota, and
Wyoming have acknowledged that the PTD is based on both public
ownership of water and public navigation rights guaranteed under the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787,138 not sovereign ownership of beds or banks,
as the 2005 AG opinion assumed.139 Since 1909, Oregon’s water code has
declared: “All water within the State from all sources of water supply belong
to the public.”140 Three-and-a-half decades later, in 1955, the legislature

statewide water management plan . . . .”). By mid-century, some Oregon waters had
appropriated rights of more than double their flow. Janet Neuman et al., Sometimes A Great
Notion: Oregon’s Instream Flow Experiments, 36 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1133 (2006). In 1954, Governor
Patterson denounced the “promiscuous, unlimited filing of water rights” that was destroying
water resources. Id. at 1137 & n.65, 1145 & n.118. Although the legislature overhauled the state
water code in response in 1955, its instream flow provisions did little to remedy depleted
streamflows and water quality. Id. at 1148 (concluding that “[t]he 1955 Water Code overhaul,
though revolutionary for its time, did not fulfill its promise to Oregon’s rivers”). In 1987, the
legislature amended the water code again to authorize instream water rights, allowing private
parties and specified government agencies to purchase water rights with senior priority dates.
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.336 (1987). See generally Janet C. Neuman, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly:
The First Ten Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. REV. 432 (2004) (concluding that “water
markets are indeed useful tools that can allow water to move to legitimate
demands voluntarily”).
136 The 1909 Oregon Water Code declared that “[a]ll water within the State from all sources
of water supply belong to the public.” Act of Feb. 24, 1909, ch. 221, 1909 Or. Laws 370, 370
(codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 536–558 (2011)).
137 See, e.g., United Plainsmen Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 462 (N.D. 1976) (interpreting the public interest language of the state water code to adopt
the PTD and explaining that “the Public Trust Doctrine requires, at a minimum, a determination
of the potential effect of the allocation of water on the present water supply and future water
needs of this State” to ensure that water rights are allocated and regulated “without detriment
to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining”); Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal.
1983) (en banc) (ruling that “public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights system are
parts of an integrated system of water law”), cert. denied sub nom. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power
v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 448
(Haw. 2000) (explaining that the PTD burdens water rights to protect public uses for navigation,
commerce, fishing, and recreation).
138 See Dunning, supra note 6, § 30.04 (describing the evolution of the public ownership of
water in Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming).
139 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 9, at 15 (connecting the PTD to state submerged
land ownership).
140 Act of Feb. 24, 1909, ch. 221, § 1, 1909 Or. Laws 319, 370. A 1932 initiative amending the
state constitution allowed for hydroelectric development, while recognizing that the public’s
ownership of water and lands under water power sites in perpetuity. See OR. CONST. art. XI-D,
§ 1 (“The rights, title and interest in and to all water for the development of water power and to
water power sites, which the state of Oregon now owns or may hereafter acquire, shall be held
by it in perpetuity.”). In 2010, the Montana Supreme Court relied on a similar statutory provision
from the same era to uphold the state’s ability to charge rent for the use of beds underlying
dams on all navigable-in-fact waters to compensate for damages to trust resources, explaining
that the state had a duty to seek this compensation that was not extinguished by the state’s
failure to meet its duty for over a century. PPL Mont., L.L.C. v. State, 229 P.3d 421, 430, 461
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reiterated in the state groundwater code the same public ownership
language from the water code.141 The legislature recognized public ownership
of water as recently as 2009.142
Public ownership of water provides additional support for the Oregon
Supreme Court’s consistent recognition of broad public commercial and
recreational rights in the state’s navigable-in-fact waters.143 Indeed, in the
1918 Guilliams decision, the Oregon Supreme Court suggested that public
rights are a consequence of both public water ownership and the public
navigation easement.144 The court observed that the public had the right to
float logs on streams with private beds because landowners “do not own the
water itself, but only the use of it as it flows past their property.”145 Public
ownership of water is therefore a basis of the state’s PTD, meaning that, as
trustee, the state has a duty to manage water resources for the benefit of
present and future generations, including an obligation to remedy
overappropriation of waterways.146
Both the courts and the legislature have recognized that the PTD’s
preferences for public water uses places limitations on water
(Mont. 2010). On February 22, 2012, the United States Supreme Court reversed on theground
that the state court improperly failed to apply the Court’s “segment-by-segment” approach to
determining which riverbeds were navigable at statehood under the equal footing doctrine,
which Justice Kennedy’s opinion described as having federal constitutional significance. PPL
Mont., LLC v. State, No. 10-218, 2012 WL 555205, at *12, *14–19, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2012) (also ruling
that the state court erred in deciding that the necessity of making portages around river
obstructions was insufficient to defeat navigability). The Court distinguished the federal equal
footing doctrine from a state’s public trust doctrine, “the contours of [which] do not depend on
the Constitution” and which the states “retain residual power to determine the scope of the
public trust.” Id. at *18.
141 OR. REV. STAT. § 537.525 (2011) (“The Legislative Assembly recognizes, declares and finds
that the right to reasonable control of all water within this state from all sources of water
supply belongs to the public, and that in order to insure the preservation of the public welfare,
safety and health . . . .”).
142 Act of July 1, 2009, ch. 907, 2009 Or. Laws 3237, 3238 (declaring that “all water within
Oregon belongs to the public pursuant to law,” authorizing the Water Resources Department to
make loans or grants for the construction of water development projects in the Columbia
River Basin).
143 See Dunning, supra note 6, § 30.04 (describing how the PTD in some states is grounded in
public ownership of water); see also supra notes 51, 67–85, 94–120 and accompanying text.
Based on public ownership of water, the Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that
“any surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be so used by the public without
regard to streambed ownership or navigability for nonrecreational purposes.” Mont. Coal. for
Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170–71 (Mont. 1984); see also Mont. Coal. for
Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984); Galt v. State Dep’t of Fish,
Wildlife, and Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 913 (Mont. 1987); In re Adjudication of Existing Rights to the
Use of All the Water, 55 P.3d 396, 404 (Mont. 2002) (discussing Curran and explaining that
“[u]nder the Constitution and the public trust doctrine, the public has an instream, nondiversionary right to the recreational use of the State’s navigable surface waters”).
144 Guilliams, 175 P. 437, 441 (Or. 1918) (concluding that “[w]hatever may be the title to the
bed of such streams or bodies of water . . . [riparian landowners] do not own the water itself,
but only the use of it as it flows past their property”).
145 Id.; see supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.
146 See generally supra notes 137, 143, and accompanying text (describing public water
ownership as a basis of the PTD in North Dakota and Montana).
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appropriations.147 Beginning in the late 1800s, the legislature withdrew
waterways from appropriation on an ad hoc basis in order to protect public
water uses like municipal water supplies.148 Then, in 1915, the legislature
withdrew streams and waterfalls in the Columbia River Gorge from
appropriation to “preserve the[ir] scenic beauty” and promote tourism.149 In
1939, the Oregon Supreme Court explained that water rights holders could
not pollute waterways in a manner that interfered with commercial fishing
practices.150 Later, in the 1950s, the legislature added minimum streamflow
provisions to the water code in order to preserve water for public uses.151
Thus, the legislature has long attempted to reign in consumptive water uses
that adversely affect public trust waters, but without significant success.152

147
148

See infra notes 152–75 and accompanying text.
See
generally
Portland
Water
Bureau,

The
Bull
Run
Watershed,
http://www.portlandonline.com/water/index.cfm?c=29748 (last visited Feb. 18, 2012)
(describing how Bull Run water was piped to Portland beginning in 1895). The 1909 Water Code
reserved Bull Run Creek from appropriation to provide drinking water for the City of Portland. Act
of Feb. 24, 1909, ch. 216, § 71, 1909 Or. Laws 319, 342 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 536–558 (2011)).
149 Act of Feb. 9, 1915, ch. 36, 1915 Or. Laws 49, 49 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 538.200 (2011)); see Bowen Blair, Jr., The Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area: The
Act, Its Genesis and Legislative History, 17 ENVTL. L. 863, 870–71, 878 (1987).
150 In Columbia River Fishermen’s Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195 (Or.
1939), the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that licensed commercial fishermen had standing to sue
the City of St. Helens and pulp and paper mills that discharged sewage, chemicals, and waste
into the Columbia River destroying fish populations and fishermen’s nets. Id. at 196–97
(recognizing plaintiff’s standing because in addition to depleting fish populations, “the pollution
of said waters . . . rott[ed] and destroy[ed] their nets and lines . . . in the sum of $3,000”).
151 In 1955, the legislature substantially revised the state water code, authorizing certain
government agencies to obtain instream water rights. Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 707, §§ 12–14,
1955 Or. Laws 924, 930–31. But this revision proved unsuccessful because of administrative
problems and because instream rights did not affect prior existing appropriated water rights.
See Neuman et al., supra note 135, at 1135, 1146 (describing problems with the instream flow
provisions of the 1955 Water Code, and providing background on the events precipitating the
enactment of the 1955 Water Code, including the Federal Power Commission’s approval of a
federal project on the Deschutes River despite the state’s objection because of interference with
public use of the water for fisheries, recreation, and scenic purposes); id. at 1131 (explaining
that “[t]he code required the state engineer to approve a permit for beneficial use of water
unless the proposed use conflicted with determined rights ‘or [was] a menace to the safety and
welfare of the public’; in such a case, the application was to be referred to the Board of Control
for decision and denial if ‘the public interest demands’” (quoting Act of Feb. 24, 1909, ch. 216,
1909 Or. Laws 319)).
152 Although the 1909 Water Code allowed the State Engineer to deny permits for beneficial
use of water if “the public interest demanded” because the proposed use conflicted with
existing rights or was “a menace to the safety and welfare of the public,” Professor Neuman has
explained that the state never established instream rights or denied permits based on that
provision. Neuman et al., supra note 135, at 1131 (discussing Act of Feb. 24, 1909, ch. 216, 1909
Or. Laws 319); see also Neuman, supra note 135, at 438 (explaining that “[t]he problem with
instream rights created by conversion of minimum streamflows or by new state agency
applications is that those two categories of instream rights have fairly junior priority dates,” but
instream rights purchased under the 1987 amendments retain senior priority dates). However,
because most instream flow rights have relatively junior priority dates, “Oregon’s flowing
streams are still in jeopardy.” Neuman et al., supra note 135, at 1148; accord Joseph Q.
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In 1987, the Oregon Legislature amended the water code to authorize
instream rights to protect public trust water uses.153 The Act enabled state
agencies to acquire instream flow rights to protect public water uses
including 1) recreation; 2) conservation, maintenance and enhancement of
aquatic life, fish, wildlife, habitat, and “any other ecological values”; 3)
pollution abatement; and 4) navigation.154 Recognizing the paramount
importance of public ownership of water, the legislature included findings
that the grant of an instream water right “shall not diminish the public’s
rights in the ownership and control of the waters of this state or the public
trust therein.”155 Under the Act, private parties can also purchase instream
rights, which then must be conveyed to and “held in trust by the Water
Resources Department for the benefit of the people of the State of Oregon to
maintain water in-stream for public use.”156 Although the legislature declared
that the state’s water resources have been impaired by “single-purpose
power or influence over the water resources” and ordered implementation
of a coordinated water policy that would serve both instream and out-ofstream needs,157 overappropriation continues to be a problem, and the courts
have a role in ensuring that the state fulfills its trustee duties by mediating
disputes between consumptive and instream uses to protect public water
use rights.158
Statutes can help the courts define the bounds of the state’s duty to
manage water rights under the PTD for the benefit of the public—the
beneficiaries of the trust.159 The product of a citizen initiative, the Scenic
Waterways Act of 1970160 provides an apt statement of the state’s duties
when managing public trust water resources in Oregon.161 Consistent with
paramount public navigation rights first recognized by the Oregon Supreme
Court in its 1869 Weise decision,162 the Scenic Waterways Act recognized that
Kaufman, An Analysis of Developing Instream Water Rights in Oregon, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
285, 303–05 (1992).
153 OR. REV. STAT. § 537.334(1) (2011) (recognizing that “[p]ublic uses are beneficial uses”).
154 Id. § 537.332(5).
155 Id. § 537.334(2).
156 Id. § 537.332(3); see Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands: Prospects for Private
Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENVTL. L. 203, 213 (1997) (“The department’s
position is that any person who leases, purchases, or receives as a gift a water right and
converts it to instream flow must transfer the right to the department to hold in trust for the
people of Oregon.”).
157 OR. REV. STAT. § 536.220(1)(c), (2)(a), (3)(a) (2011).
158 See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
159 See Dunning, supra note 6, § 31.03 (describing how the PTD has developed to include
judicial supervision of administrative action to guarantee environmental preservation); see also
WaterWatch of Or., Inc. v. Water Res. Comm’n, 112 P.3d 443, 444–45 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)
(recognizing that a flyfisherman has standing to challenge rules for groundwater appropriations
that could adversely affect his use of a river for fishing and recreation).
160 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 390.805–390.925 (2011).
161 Id.; see generally Charles C. Reynolds, Protecting Oregon’s Free-Flowing Water, 19 ENVTL.
L. 841, 842, 848–51 (1989) (describing events precipitating the passage of the voter’s initiative
that enacted the Scenic Waterways Act of 1970, which protected 496 river miles for recreational
and scenic purposes).
162 See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text.
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the “highest and best uses of the waters within scenic waterways are
recreation, fish and wildlife uses” and specified that “[t]he free-flowing
character of these waters shall be maintained in quantities necessary for
recreation, fish and wildlife uses.”163 The statute applies to designated scenic
waters and related adjacent land, prohibiting new groundwater
appropriations that would adversely affect public fishing, navigation, and
recreation rights in scenic waterways.164 The Water Resources Commission
must deny permits for groundwater appropriations that reduce flows of
scenic waterways, unless the applicant mitigates damage to public uses
under a “no-diminishment standard.”165
The state has a duty under the PTD to protect public water resources
for public uses consistent with “no-diminishment” trust principles, and
statutes may help define when the state has failed to meet its duty and owes
compensation to the trust.166 In its 1979 decision of Morse v. Oregon Division
of State Lands,167 the most recent case involving an interpretation of the
Oregon PTD, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed a Division of State
Lands’s decision that rejected a private landowner’s application for a
wetlands fill project permit under the fill and removal statute.168 The court
explained that the legislature enacted the wetlands fill and removal permit
program “to codify the jus publicum and to provide procedures for its
orderly administration” because “[t]he legislative history [of the fill and
removal statute] reflects that the legislature was aware of the historical
163 OR. REV. STAT. § 390.835(1) (2011). The 1970 initiative acknowledged broad and evolving
public rights in water and wildlife resources by declaring that designated scenic lakes and rivers
“possess outstanding scenic, fish, wildlife, geological, botanical, historic, archaeologic, and
outdoor recreation values of present and future benefit to the public.” Id. § 390.815.
164 Id. § 390.805 (defining “scenic waterway” as Waldo Lake and designated waterways, and
“related adjacent land” as “all land within one-fourth of one mile of the bank on the side . . .
except land that, in the [State Parks and Recreation Department’s] judgment, does not affect the
view from the waters within a scenic waterway”).
165 WaterWatch of Or., Inc. v. Water Res. Comm’n, 112 P.3d 443, 447, 449 & n.3 (Or. Ct. App.
2005) (explaining that the Act requires the Commission to deny a permit for groundwater use if
it determines that “the use of ground water will measurably reduce the surface water flows
necessary to maintain the free-flowing character of a scenic waterway in quantities necessary
for recreation, fish, and wildlife” unless the applicant explains how it will mitigate adverse
impacts (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 390.835(9)(a) (2011))).
166 Marshall v. Frazier, 81 P.2d 132, 134 (Or. 1938) (explaining that “[t]he question of what is
a reasonable compensation for trustees depends largely on the circumstances of each particular
case, and can not be properly determined by any inflexible rule” (citation omitted)); 76 AM. JUR.
2D Trusts § 276 (2005) (“Where the trustee makes an unauthorized conversion, transfer, or
encumbrance of trust property or funds, the beneficiary of the trust may elect to hold the
trustee personally liable and accountable for this breach of trust.”); id. § 345 (“Misapplication of
the trust estate renders the trustee immediately liable for the proceeds or the value of the
property misapplied, at the option of the beneficiary.”).
167 581 P.2d 520 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), aff’d, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979) (en banc).
168 Id. at 528; Morse, 590 P.2d at 715 (remanding the issuance of a permit for a fill of wetlands
because the director of the Division of State Lands failed to make findings required under the
dredge and fill statute); see also Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19
ENVTL. L. 473, 473–74 (1989) (discussing Morse as exemplary of water resource disputes likely
to arise in the future, and the Mono Lake decision’s interpretation of the PTD as a foundation
for resolving these disputes).
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public trust, was motivated by the same concerns that underlie the public
trust, and chose language which would best perpetuate it.”169
The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals’s reversal of the
permit because the director failed to make a finding that the public need for
the project “outweigh[ed] the detriment to the use of the waters in question
for navigation, fishing and recreational purposes.”170 As the instream water
rights statute and the Morse decisions demonstrate, Oregon statutory law
can incorporate the PTD and favor nonconsumptive uses, providing support
for determinations that maintain public uses of flowing waters.171
Oregon courts therefore should supervise the administration of water
rights to ensure that overappropriation neither unreasonably interferes with
public uses nor impairs ecological conditions.172 Based on the cases and
legislation discussed in this section, it seems evident that the Oregon PTD
has both a common law and statutory basis.173 Because the legislature has
recognized that all water is owned by the public,174 and the paramount nature
of public navigation rights,175 Oregon courts should recognize that public
water use rights burden appropriated water rights,176 requiring the state to
continuously supervise water use in the state to ensure no damage to
trust resources.177

B. Wildlife
Sovereign ownership of wildlife originated in Roman law (ferae
naturae), migrated to English common law, and exists now in virtually every
state, as wildlife is managed as a trust resource for the benefit of the

169
170

Morse, 581 P.2d at 525.
Morse, 590 P.2d at 714. The court did not disturb the court of appeals’ ruling that the fill

and removal statute enacted the PTD, but it did rule, 4 to 3, that neither the PTD nor the statute
banned non-water-dependent uses. Id. at 712.
171 See supra notes 159–69 and accompanying text.
172 See Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The
Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 662–63 (2010) (explaining that
conveyances of trust resources are defeasible); id. at 666 (arguing that the PTD requires the
state to balance public and private interests in trust resources, and explaining that “[t]his
accommodation meant that there would be a balancing of public and private rights in fulfilling
the trust responsibility, which is hardly an evisceration of private property, unless private
property means a kind of private sovereignty immune from state control” (footnote omitted)).
173 The California courts recognize both a common law and statutory basis of the state’s
PTD. See Envtl. Prot. & Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 926
(Cal. 2008).
174 See supra notes 136, 140–42 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 2, 90, 119 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 129, 137 and accompanying text.
177 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983) (stating the “public trust doctrine and the
appropriative water rights system are parts of an integrated system of water law”), cert. denied
sub nom. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Blumm,
supra note 172, at 666 (“By imposing on the state a continuous supervisory duty to attempt to
preserve trust assets Mono Lake ruled that 1) there were no vested private rights that limited
the trust, 2) private grantees use rights were limited by the trust responsibility, and 3) the state
was not confined to erroneous past decisions.” (footnotes omitted)).
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public.178 Since the 1880s, the Oregon Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that the state owns fish and wildlife within its borders in this
sovereign capacity, and is able to regulate wildlife harvests to maintain
populations.179 As recently as 2011, in Simpson v. Department of Fish and
Wildlife,180 the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed that the state owns wildlife
within its borders in a constructive, sovereign capacity.181
Oregon law has long recognized that public ownership of wildlife
means the state has a duty to manage wildlife resources as sovereign trustee
for the public.182 In 1893, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld state authority to
regulate fish harvests so that fish “may have an opportunity to propagate their
species, and be preserved from extermination.”183 Fifteen years later, the
court reiterated the state’s duty to prevent species extinction, explaining in
its 1908 decision of State v. Hume that:

178 See generally Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust:
The American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 675–81, 706

(2005) (tracing the origins of the wildlife trust doctrine and observing that “the state ownership
doctrine lives on . . . in virtually all states, affording states ample authority to regulate the taking
of wildlife and to protect their habitat”); THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW 57–100
(1980) (discussing the history of state and federal wildlife law); DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T.
FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 381–409 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing the evolving
role of states holding wildlife in trust for the people).
179 See, e.g., State v. Pulos, 129 P. 128, 130 (Or. 1913) (upholding the defendant’s conviction
for possessing a wild duck out of season because the statute did not except ducks captured
during open season, and explaining that “title to wild game is in the state, and . . . the taking of
them is not a right, but is a privilege, which may be restricted, prohibited, or conditioned, as the
lawmaking power may see fit”); State v. Fisher, 98 P. 713, 714–15 (Or. 1908) (explaining that the
defendant could be convicted for possessing deer out of season, but had a right to present
evidence that he killed the deer during open season to avoid liability, based on an exception in
the statute); State v. Hume, 95 P. 808, 810–11 (Or. 1908) (affirming the defendant’s conviction for
carrying canned salmon without a license as a valid exercise of the police power); State v.
Schuman, 58 P. 661, 662–63 (Or. 1899) (upholding the defendant’s conviction for possessing
trout imported from Washington under an Oregon law declaring “[i]t shall be unlawful to sell,
offer for sale, or have in possession for sale, any species of trout at any time”); State v. McGuire,
33 P. 666, 667, 671 (Or. 1893) (describing the state’s authority to regulate fish and wildlife
harvests and holding that the defendant’s possession of salmon in closed season was not
unlawful because the salmon had been caught during the open season).
180 255 P.3d 565 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
181 See id. at 569–73 (discussing case law supporting the legislature’s assertion of sovereign
ownership of wildlife from 1921 to the present).
182 Monroe v. Withycome, 165 P. 227, 229 (Or. 1917) (“Fish are classified as feræ naturæ, and
while in a state of freedom their ownership, so far as a right of property can be asserted, is in
the state, not as a proprietor, but in its sovereign capacity for the benefit of and in trust for its
people in common.”); Pulos, 129 P. at 129–30; see also infra notes 189–90 and accompanying
text; Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Wildlife Trust: A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 605, 608–12 (2004) (describing the wildlife trust as
“clearly enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Geer v. Connecticut” (citing Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)). See generally Dale D. Goble, Three Cases/Four Tales:
Commons, Capture, the Public Trust, and Property in Land, 35 ENVTL. L. 807, 846–47 (2005)
(describing the evolution of the wildlife trust as interconnected with the development of the
state’s police power, and the idea that private property rights are not absolute).
183 McGuire, 33 P. at 668.
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It is a generally recognized principle that migratory fish in the navigable waters
of a state, like game within its borders, are classed as animals ferae naturae,
the title to which, so far as that claim is capable of being asserted before
possession is obtained, is held by the state, in its sovereign capacity in trust for
all its citizens; and as an incident of the assumed ownership, the legislative
assembly may enact such laws as tend to protect the species from injury by
184
human means and from extinction by exhaustive methods of capture.

In the early 1900s, the legislature carried out its sovereign trust duty by
enacting several statutes regulating or prohibiting wildlife harvests,
including the hunting, taking, or possession of species like salmon
and beavers.185
By 1920, on at least five occasions, the Oregon Supreme Court had
affirmed that the state was sovereign owner of wildlife as trustee for the
public, with concomitant power to regulate wildlife harvests.186 In 1921, the
legislature codified Oregon’s sovereign ownership of wildlife and power to
regulate harvests, declaring that “[n]o person shall at any time or in any
manner acquire any property in . . . any of the wild game animals, fur-bearing
animals, game birds, nongame birds or game fish, or any part thereof, of the
state of Oregon, but they shall always and under all circumstances be and
remain the property of the state, except . . . [when harvested as allowed by
law].”187 Thus, early in the twentieth century the Oregon Supreme Court and
the legislature had firmly established the state’s power to regulate wildlife
based on its principle of sovereign wildlife ownership.188
In a 2011 decision, the court of appeals explained that Oregon statutes
have acknowledged sovereign wildlife ownership since 1921 without
substantial substantive change.189 The court rejected a contention that game
farm animals were not wildlife under the Oregon Wildlife Code, explaining
that “the state’s property interest in wildlife is sovereign, not proprietary.”190
Both case law and statutes therefore recognize that the state’s authority to
regulate wildlife harvests is grounded not only on its police power, but also
on its sovereign ownership of wildlife.191
184

95 P. at 810.
See, e.g., Act of Feb 16, 1891, 1891 Or. Laws 33 (entitled an “Act to Protect Salmon and
Other Food Fishes in the State of Oregon,” as amended by 1893 Or. Laws 145 (1893)
(establishing salmon fishing seasons)); 1931 Or. Laws 693 (providing that it is unlawful to trap
beavers outside of open season).
186 See supra notes 179, 182 and accompanying text.
187 Act of Feb. 21, 1921, ch. 153, 1921 Or. Laws 267, 267.
188 See supra notes 179, 182–85 and accompanying text. See generally Blumm & Ritchie,
supra note 178, at 706 (identifying both the police power and sovereign ownership as the bases
of the wildlife trust, and arguing that “the state ownership doctrine lives on . . . in virtually all
states, affording states ample authority to regulate the taking of wildlife and to protect
their habitat”).
189 Simpson v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 255 P.3d 565, 571–73 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining
that changes to the wildlife code in the 1970s were motivated by an attempt to “simplify the
language and consolidate the duplicative,” but not to change the substance of the laws).
190 Id. at 572. See generally Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 331–35 (1979) (describing the
state’s constructive ownership of wildlife as an incident of state sovereign power).
191 See supra notes 182–90 and accompanying text.
185
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Unlike the police power, however, which vests the state with the
authority to regulate in the public interest, sovereign ownership of wildlife in
trust imposes an affirmative duty on the state to maintain wildlife for the
benefit of present and future generations.192 Early American case law
established that public rights in wildlife are a component of citizenship, and
the sovereign ownership doctrine prohibits discrimination among classes of
citizens with respect to wildlife harvest rights.193 The Oregon legislature has
enacted many statutes to restore declining wildlife populations,
acknowledging the state’s duty to protect habitat and water resources in
order to maintain wildlife populations for the public benefit.194
Because public rights in wildlife are a component of citizenship,
members of the public should have standing to enforce the state’s trust duty
to maintain wildlife resources,195 particularly when statutory remedies are
unavailable.196 The Oregon Supreme Court’s 1939 case of Columbia River
192 See Wood, supra note 182, at 612 (arguing that “where there has been damage to trust
assets, the trustees have an affirmative duty to recoup damages and restore the corpus”); supra
note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the obligations of trustees).
193 See, e.g., Hughes, 441 U.S. at 332–35 (describing how many courts have struck down laws
regulating fish and wildlife harvests that discriminated among classes of citizens under the
privileges and immunities clause, but affirming the state’s power to regulate harvests, including
by prohibiting particular harvest methods).
194 For example, the policy of the Watershed Management and Enhancement Act of 1999 is
to “[a]ssess[] the conditions in each watershed to determine the quality of the existing
environment, to identify the causes for declines in habitat, fish and wildlife populations and
water quality, and to assist with the development of locally integrated action plans for
watersheds that will achieve agreed-upon protection and restoration objectives.” OR. REV. STAT.
§ 541.895 (2011). See generally OR. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, OREGON WILDLIFE AND
COMMERCIAL FISHING CODES 55–72 (2002) (including the text of miscellaneous wildlife
protection statutes).
195 Oregonians have broad standing to bring suit under the state’s Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act, which states that “[c]ourts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could
be claimed.” OR. REV. STAT. § 28.010 (2011) (providing that “[n]o action or proceeding shall be
open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment is prayed for. The declaration may
be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the force
and effect of a judgment”). In 2006, the Oregon Supreme Court explained that the legislature
can grant “any person” standing rights to challenge an agency rule or determination because the
Oregon constitution does not include a cases and controversies requirement like the federal
constitution. Kellas v. Dep’t of Corr., 145 P.3d 139, 142 (Or. 2006). In 2010, the court clarified
that the state Administrative Procedures Act requires a person be “adversely affected or
aggrieved” within the meaning of the statute. Pete’s Mtn. Homeowners Ass’n v. Or. Water Res.
Dep’t, 238 P.3d 395, 401 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
196 See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 178, at 714–15 (explaining that the state has a duty to
prevent substantial impairment of trust resources following Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1896); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); and Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983), cert. denied sub nom., L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 464 U.S. 977
(1983)); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 601
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing that the public has standing to challenge agency decisions
because they do not always strike an appropriate balance between protecting trust resources
and accommodating other legitimate public interests); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 93
P.3d 643, 658 (Haw. 2004) (vacating the state water commission’s decision regarding allocation
of water resources because the state failed to weigh competing public and private water uses on
a case-by-case basis in light of trust values); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,
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Fishermen’s Protective Union v. City of St. Helens197 provides a helpful case
example. The court affirmed a lower court injunction preventing further
pollution damage to lower Columbia River salmon populations, deciding that
commercial salmon fishermen had a cause of action against industrial and
municipal polluters.198 Rejecting the assertion that the fishermen suffered no
special injury necessary to bring a nuisance suit,199 the court explained that
the injury to the fishermen’s livelihoods was distinct from the injury suffered
by the general public.200 Thus, eighty years ago, the Oregon Supreme Court
ruled that citizens may maintain suits to prevent unreasonable damage to
wildlife populations when the state does not meet its duty to maintain
wildlife populations sufficient for public uses.201 This duty should include
providing a suitable habitat to support sustainable populations, and the
courts should recognize that the public, as beneficiary of the PTD, has
standing to bring suit against public and private entities when resource uses
threaten to interfere with public rights.
The PTD provides a useful framework to unify public rights to navigate
and to use water and wildlife. In 1959, the AG acknowledged that public
water and wildlife use rights were intertwined.202 Considering whether the
Oregon National Guard could lease land with exclusive waterfowl shooting
privileges on Slusher Lake,203 the AG explained that regardless of bed
ownership, both sovereign ownership of wildlife and the public’s navigation
easement guarantee public rights to fish and hunt on all navigable waters in
Oregon.204 The AG acknowledged “a conflict on whether the public has a
right to hunt where the bed of a lake is privately owned,” but after reviewing
Guilliams and Luscher,205 explained that “the right of hunting and fishing on
water navigable-in-fact exists regardless of title to the bed as an incident of
navigation.”206 Consequently, the AG opined that the Oregon National Guard
could not grant exclusive hunting rights on the lake because hunting and
fishing rights are free and common to all citizens in the state.207 This
452, 454 (Haw. 2000) (citing Mono Lake as instructive while positing that Hawaii’s public trust
doctrine may require more protection than California’s because of geographical difference, but
nevertheless recognizing a preference for accommodating both instream and offstream uses
where feasible).
197 87 P.2d 195 (Or. 1939).
198 See id. at 198.
199 Id. at 199 (noting that the fishermen could seek an injunction as an equitable remedy, but
had no remedy at law).
200 Id. at 196–97 (recognizing plaintiff’s standing based on injury to their livelihood because,
in addition to depleting fish populations, “the pollution of said waters . . . rott[ed] and
destroy[ed] their nets and lines . . . in the sum of $3,000”).
201 See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
202 THORNTON, supra note 43, at 311–12.
203 Id. at 311.
204 Id. at 312.
205 Id. at 312; see supra notes 99–113 and accompanying text (discussing the Guilliams
decision’s recognition of public navigation rights independent of bed ownership); supra notes
114–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Luscher decision’s recognition of the
same distinction).
206 THORNTON, supra note 43, at 312.
207 Id. (explaining that doing so would transform public rights into a monopoly).
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reasoning suggests that Oregon courts should recognize that wildlife
resources are protected under the PTD because of paramount public
hunting, fishing, and recreational rights, including birdwatching and
wildlife viewing.208
In 2008, California expressly recognized that wildlife is part of the PTD.
In Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group,209 the court of appeals
ruled that “[t]he public trust doctrine applies to wildlife, including raptors
and other birds.”210 The court noted that “[b]ecause wildlife are generally
transient and not easily confined, through the centuries and across societies
they have been held to belong to no one and therefore to belong to everyone
in common.”211 Citing United States Supreme Court authority, the court
concluded the state must exercise its authority over the common property in
game animals as a trust, “represent[ing the] people . . . in their united
sovereignty.”212 As a result, even though wildlife is regulated under the state’s
“police power and explicit statutory authorization . . . the public retains the
right to bring actions to enforce the trust when the public agencies fail to
discharge their duties.”213 Thus, the public had a right to sue state and local
agencies for permitting more than 5000 wind generators in Altamont Pass,
whose operations unnecessarily killed tens of thousands of birds, including
thousands of raptors.214
Similarly, Oregon has long recognized that the state owns wildlife in a
sovereign capacity, as trustee for the public.215 By protecting public rights,
including hunting and fishing on all navigable-for-public-use waters, the
Oregon Supreme Court and AG have recognized that wildlife and waters are
publicly owned trust resources that must be managed for the benefit of the

208 See, e.g., Doty v. Coos Cnty., 59 P.3d 50, 51 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing that a
birdwatcher had standing to challenge an order of the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals), aff’d
and clarified on reh’g, 64 P.3d 1150 (Or. 2003); WaterWatch of Or., Inc. v. Water Res. Comm’n,
112 P.3d 443, 444–45 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing that a flyfisherman had standing to
challenge rules for groundwater appropriations that could adversely affect his use of a river).
209 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
210 Id. at 595 (rejecting a contention that “the public trust doctrine applies only to tidelands
and navigable waters, and has no application to wildlife”).
211 Id. at 597 (quoting James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the
Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 86 (2007)).
212 Id. at 598 (citing, for example, Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896)).
213 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 601 (explaining that “[m]any of the cases
establishing the public trust doctrine in this country and in California have been brought by
private parties to prevent agencies of government from abandoning or neglecting the rights of
the public with respect to resources subject to the public trust”) (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct. of Alameda Cnty., 606 P.2d 362
(Cal. 1980)).
214 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 592, 601. However, the court held that the
public trust claim must be brought against public agencies as trustees of the wildlife, not the
wind generators, id. at 602–06, a result seemingly inconsistent with the California Supreme
Court’s decision in Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 378, 381 (Cal. 1971) (en banc), which
recognized the standing of a landowner to sue a neighbor who attempted to fill PTDprotected tidelands. Id.
215 See supra notes 178–94 and accompanying text.
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public, not private interests.216 A number of statutes, cases, and AG opinions
suggest that Oregon courts should expressly recognize the state’s trustee
duty to preserve wildlife resources for the benefit of present and
future generations.217

C. Beaches and Uplands
Oregon’s PTD extends to uplands when reasonably necessary to enable
public navigation, or to maintain public water and wildlife trust resources.218
In the Oregon Supreme Court’s first decision on public navigation rights in
1869, Weise v. Smith, the court recognized public use rights in uplands when
necessary for log floats.219 The court explained that loggers could construct
temporary booms on private property when necessary to enable navigation
for commercial purposes.220
A century later, in the 1969 case of State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,221 the
Oregon Supreme Court endorsed custom as a basis for recognizing public
rights to recreate on Oregon ocean beaches.222 The Hay court explained that
public had customary rights to use ocean beaches as highways of commerce,
rights which existed prior to statehood and which were burdened private

216 See supra notes 197–207 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A (describing
public rights of navigation, fishing, commerce, and recreation in all Oregon waters regardless of
underlying bed ownership).
217 See generally Dunning, supra note 6, § 30.04 (explaining that when the PTD stems from
public water and wildlife ownership, it protects these resources but “obviates the need for a
finding as to bed ownership”); Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of

Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II):
Instilling a Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENVTL. L. 91, 95–98 (2009) (describing the
state’s fiduciary duty to maintain public trust resources, including wildlife).
218 See infra notes 219–20 and accompanying text (explaining how the Weise decision
recognized that the PTD applies to uplands when necessary to enable navigation); supra note
164 and accompanying text (describing how the Scenic Waterways Act applies to adjacent lands
that affect scenic waters).
219 Weise, 3 Or. 445, 450 (1869) (explaining that the public had limited rights to use uplands
when necessary to enable navigation, including the right to construct booms on private
property for a reasonable time to enable log floats). As explained above, the public navigation
easement originated in the public highways language in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
which was incorporated in the Oregon Statehood Act. See supra Part III.A (discussing public
navigation rights).
220 Weise, 3 Or. at 451–52 (“If there had been no necessity for fastening the boom to the
plaintiff’s land, the act of fastening it would have been a trespass, for which the plaintiff ought
to recover nominal damages at least; but if the act was necessary in order to enable the plaintiff
to exercise a right of navigation, no cause of action would lie for a bare intrusion which worked
no appreciable damages.”); see Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1092
(2011) (noting that courts have excused trespasses supported by significant public interests by
both assessing nominal damages and creating “context-specific exceptions”).
221 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
222 Id. at 676. See generally STRATON, supra note 30 (describing how the Beach Bill
established a public right to access the beaches for recreation); Or. Pub. Broad., supra note 30
(listing Thornton v. Hay on its timeline of public beach access in Oregon and dubbing the case a
“landmark” decision). In the 1967 Beach Bill, the Oregon Legislature declared that the public
had the right to use ocean beaches in the state. Id.
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titles due to the public’s long, uninterrupted, peaceable, and lawful use of
ocean beaches.223 But the public’s right to use ocean beaches is also a public
trust right and ought to be understood as part of the state’s PTD.224
Although the majority in Hay adopted the doctrine of custom,225 the PTD
is a complementary, if not better justification for the public’s easement.226 In
his concurring opinion, Justice Denecke examined the state’s long
recognition of the PTD, including the Guilliams, Luscher, and other decisions,
and suggested that sovereign ownership, or the jus publicum, was a more
suitable vehicle for protecting public recreational beach use.227 He explained
that “[t]hese rights of the public in tidelands and in the beds of navigable
streams have been called ‘jus publicum’ and we have consistently and
recently reaffirmed their existence.”228 Analogizing beaches to waters, and
relying on Guilliams and Luscher, Justice Denecke recognized that the

223 Hay, 462 P.2d at 677 (explaining that “[t]he custom of the people of Oregon to use the drysand area of the beaches for public recreational purposes meets every one of
Blackstone’s requisites”).
224 In New Jersey, the PTD protects the public’s right to use beaches. See Matthews v. Bay
Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363–64 (N.J. 1984) (recognizing that public rights to use
the dry sand area of private beaches takes two forms: access and use rights. “First, the public
may have a right to cross privately owned dry sand beaches in order to gain access to the
foreshore. Second, this interest may be of the sort enjoyed by the public . . , namely, the right to
sunbathe and generally enjoy recreational activities.”); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis
Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 113 (N.J. 2005) (applying the PTD to privately owned beaches
and noting “the public trust doctrine requires the Atlantis [upland sand beach] property to be
open to the general public”).
225 Hay, 462 P.2d at 676. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed Attorney General Robert
Thornton’s order directing a motel owner to remove a fence from his beachfront property,
ratifying the beach bill’s recognition of the public right to recreate on ocean beaches based on
the doctrine of custom. Id. at 673 (explaining that public recreational use of beaches was an
established custom since not only “the beginning of the state’s political history” but also
“the time of earliest settlement”).
226 See Carl D. Etling, Who Owns the Wildlife?, 3 ENVTL. L. 23, 24–26 (1973) (explaining the
history of state constructive ownership of wildlife in the United States and Oregon); DePoorter,
supra note 220, at 1092–94, 1110 (explaining that exceptions to trespass theories should be
refined from a patchwork of doctrines into a unified theory of fair trespass, and that,
particularly in the context of beaches, custom, and the “public trust doctrine reserves public
access rights to private property” (citing Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969); City of Daytona
Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854
P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993) (en banc))); see also Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 97, 101 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986) (affirming the district court’s finding of a public easement to the beach through,
inter alia, the doctrine of custom).
227 Hay, 462 P.2d at 679 (Denecke, J., concurring) (citing Luscher, 56 P.2d 1158 (Or. 1936);
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Land Bd., 439 P.2d 575 (Or. 1968) (en banc)). In citing
Luscher, Justice Denecke’s concurrence recognized that the public trust doctrine burdened all
navigable-for-public-use waters, not merely navigable-for-title waters. See supra Part III
(discussing Oregon Supreme Court cases recognizing public rights to fish, recreate, navigate,
and engage in commerce including log floats on all navigable-in-fact waters irrespective of bed
ownership).
228 Hay, 462 P.2d at 679 (Denecke, J., concurring) (citing Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 439 P.2d
575 (Or. 1968); Smith Tug & Barge Co. v. Columbia–Pac. Towing Corp., 443 P.2d 205 (Or. 1968)
(en banc)).
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public’s right to use extends to dry sand beaches.229 Actually, the Oregon
Supreme Court’s first decision on the scope of public navigation rights in its
1869 Weise decision anticipated Hay by allowing public use of private
uplands when necessary to enable public navigation.230 As explained above,231
the Weise court recognized public rights to use private property when
necessary for log floats.232 Public access to ocean beaches is a similar
ancillary right, necessary to allow for effective public use of publicly
owned tidelands.233
Historically, public navigation occurred on both the shoreline and the
waters in tidal areas, because beaches provided a convenient travel route
along the state’s rugged coast.234 In its 1885 decision of Wilson v. Welch,235 the
Oregon Supreme Court reiterated that public rights could burden private
property rights in tidelands despite state sales of the jus privatum in such
lands, relying on the three classes of rights in shorelands: “[f]irst, the jus
privatum, or right of property or franchise; second, the jus publicum, or
public right of passage and navigation; and, third, the jus regium, or
governmental right.”236 After Governor Oswald West declared Oregon
tidelands to be public highways in 1913,237 the legislature repealed statutes
authorizing sales of tidelands and upheld the public easement for tideland
use.238 Thus, long before Oregon voters flooded the legislature with letters in

229 Id.; see also Erin Pitts, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tool for Ensuring
Continued Public Use of Oregon Beaches, 22 ENVTL. L. 731, 733 (1992) (maintaining that

Justice Denecke’s concurrence gives Oregon courts the option of recognizing the PTD as an
independent basis for protecting public rights to recreate on Oregon beaches).
230 See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text; Stevens, 854 P.2d at 453, 456–57 (rejecting
assertions that the state’s denial of a permit to construct a seawall was an unconstitutional
taking, and commenting that “[p]laintiffs [did] not ask this court to overrule Thornton, and they
[did] not argue that any portion of the Beach Bill is unconstitutional”).
231 See supra notes 219–20, Part III.A (discussing the Weise opinion).
232 Weise, 3 Or. 445, 451 (1869) (“[I]f the act [of constructing temporary log booms] was
necessary in order to enable the plaintiff to exercise a right of navigation, no cause of action
would lie for a bare intrusion which worked no appreciable damages.”).
233 See infra notes 234–38 and accompanying text.
234 See generally Or. Pub. Broad., supra note 30 (describing the fight to preserve public
access to beaches, including the right to use them “as a public highway”); Or. Pub. Broad.,
Oregon Experience: The Beach Bill, Oregon Beaches Gallery, http://www.opb.org/programs/
oregonexperiencearchive/beachbill/gallery.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (providing photos of
Oregonians enjoying the wet and dry sand areas and stating that “[i]n 1913 Governor Oswald
West declared the tidelands a public highway forever protecting them from
private development”).
235 7 P. 341 (Or. 1885).
236 Id. at 345.
237 See Or. State Archives, supra note 30 (describing how beaches were protected for public
use during West’s governorship, which followed his tenure as State Land Agent, during which
he recovered 900,000 acres of school trust lands fraudulently acquired by speculators).
238 See Act of Feb 13, 1913, ch. 47, 1913 Or. Laws 80, 80 (“The shore of the Pacific Ocean,
between ordinary high tide and extreme low tide, and from the Columbia River on the north to
the Oregon and California State line on the south . . . is hereby declared a public highway and
shall forever remain open as such to the public.”); Or. State Archives, supra note 30. See
generally Or. Pub. Broad., supra note 30 (explaining that the fight over public access “erupted
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support of the 1967 beach bill,239 Oregon already had well-established law
protecting public rights to use tidelands as highways of commerce. In light
of the Weise court’s century-old recognition of ancillary public rights to use
uplands when necessary to enable public navigation,240 the Hay decision was
hardly the unexpected sea change that Justice Scalia once suggested.241
Modern Oregon courts should recognize that both custom and the PTD
support public rights to use beaches and tidelands.242 Based on a century of
case law from 1869 to 1969, the Oregon PTD protects public rights to use
uplands when necessary to enable water use for public purposes recognized
under the public navigation easement and protected by the PTD, including
boating, fishing, swimming, and other recreational activities.243

into the hottest issue of the 1967 legislative session and created the greatest public response to
any issue in Oregon’s legislative history”).
239 See Or. Pub. Broad., supra note 30; STRATON, supra note 30, at 26–29.
240 See supra notes 73, 219–20, 232 and accompanying text.
241 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211–12 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(implying that Oregon denied private property rights protected under the Takings Clause “by
invoking nonexistent rules of state substantive law” and referring to the doctrine of custom as
“a landgrab”). Justice Scalia also seemed to think that the Oregon Supreme Court inconsistently
applied the doctrine of custom laid down in Hay and reiterated in Stevens. Id. at 1211 n.3. He
pointed out that in McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714, 724 (Or. 1989) (en banc), the Oregon
Supreme Court refused to apply public customary rights to a beach that was not adjacent to the
ocean and which the public had not historically used. Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1212 n.5. But if public
beach rights are ancillary rights that spring from the public’s ownership of adjacent tidelands,
the result in Halvorsen is explainable by the lack of adjacent tidelands as well as the lack of
customary use.
242 See supra notes 222–33 and accompanying text; infra notes 243–44 and
accompanying text.
243 Guilliams, 175 P. 437, 442 (Or. 1918) (ruling that the PTD encompasses “sailing, rowing,
fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and even city
purposes, cutting ice, and other public purposes which cannot now be enumerated or even
anticipated” (quoting Lamprey, 52 N.W. 1139 (Wis. 1893))); see also Wood, supra note 182, at
612 (arguing that the state has an affirmative duty to remedy damages to trust resources for the
public benefit). Oregon courts have not addressed whether the public has a right to cross
uplands out of necessity to access public trust water resources. However, as in other states, the
public likely has the right to access navigable-for-public-use waters from public bridges or
roads, even those not maintained by the state. See generally Webb v. Clodfelter, 132 P.3d 50, 51–
52, 54 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding hunters’ rights to use a road of unknown origin, and
explaining that “the use of an existing road of unknown origin over the servient owner’s
property in a way that does not interfere with the servient owner’s use will defeat a
presumption of adverseness”); Trewin v. Hunter, 531 P.2d 899, 901 (Or. 1975) (en banc) (stating
that when there is no evidence of who constructed a commonly used road, “it should be
presumed that the servient owner constructed it for his own use,” thereby establishing that a
neighbor’s longstanding use is permissive, not adverse); Boyer v. Abston, 544 P.2d 1031, 1031–32
(Or. 1976) (en banc) (following the explaination that a landowner’s predecessor had always
allowed miners, hunters, and neighbors to use a road, the court held that the claimant failed to
establish adverse possession of an easement because his use of the road was permissive).
The Oregon legislature established a policy in favor of public rights to access and use
uplands without unreasonably burdening landowners in the 1995 Public Use of Lands Act, OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 105.672–105.696 (2011). That statute encouraged landowners to open land for
recreational use by providing immunity from suits “in contract or tort for any personal injury,
death or property damage that arises out of the use of the land for recreational purposes,
gardening, woodcutting or the harvest of special forest products.” OR. REV. STAT. § 105.682(1)
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The Oregon PTD may also include rights to cross uplands or portage
when reasonably necessary to access public water resources.244 In Weise, the
1869 Oregon Supreme Court recognized that the public had privileged, nontrespassory rights to use uplands when necessary to enable useful public
navigation.245 The court explained that, under the jus publicum, the public
navigation easement includes the right “founded upon necessity . . . to
meddle with the bank, [but] it is only an incidental [right].”246 A century later,
in Hay and Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,247 the modern Oregon Supreme
Court recognized public rights to use all Oregon beaches under the doctrine
of custom, a proposition supported by the Weise precedent.248 Based on
these cases and the legislature’s consistent policy of favoring public access
to recreational waters,249 the Oregon PTD should include ancillary public
rights to reasonable use of uplands, when necessary to access waters.250
(2011). Recreational uses included in the statute are “outdoor activities such as hunting, fishing,
swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, nature study, outdoor educational activities,
waterskiing, winter sports, viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific
sites or volunteering for any public purpose project.” Id. § 105.672(5). A landowner receives
immunity only if she does not charge a fee for the use of her land, although there are some
exceptions for parking fees and other costs associated with providing public access. Id.
§ 105.688. When faced with difficult situations questioning the balance between public and
private rights, the courts should affirm paramount public navigation rights without imposing
unreasonable burdens on landowners.
244 See supra notes 73, 219–20, 232 and accompanying text. In Herrin v. Sutherland, the 1925
Montana Supreme Court explained that a member of the public may have the right to cross
private land to access public property out of necessity. 241 P. 328, 333 (Mont. 1925). In Curran,
the Montana Supreme Court upheld a statute allowing the public to portage around barriers on
navigable waters in a reasonable fashion as a pre-existing right under the state PTD, probably
based on the doctrine of necessity. 682 P.2d 163, 172 (Mont. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2311(1) (2011) (“A member of the public making recreational use of surface waters may, above
the ordinary high-water mark, portage around barriers in the least intrusive manner possible,
avoiding damage to the landowner’s land and violation of the landowner’s rights.”). The court
severed a provision requiring landowners to construct public portage routes as an
unconstitutional taking of private property. See Galt v. State Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731
P.2d 912, 914, 916 (Mont. 1987) (severing subsection (3)(e) from MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-311
because “although the recreational user has a right to portage around obstructions . . . there can
be no responsibility on behalf of the landowner to pay for such portage right”).
245 Weise, 3 Or. 445, 451 (Or. 1869); see Pitts, supra note 229, at 733 (suggesting that based on
Justice Denecke’s comment in Hay, the court could recognize the PTD as an independent basis
for protecting public rights to recreate on Oregon beaches).
246 Weise, 3 Or. at 451; see supra notes 219–20, 232 and accompanying text. In Lebanon
Lumber Co. v. Leonard, 136 P. 891 (Or. 1913), the Oregon Supreme Court, without referencing
the Weise decision, stated that public navigation rights did not include a use right on private
lands adjacent to a stream unless necessary “to reclaim stranded property which has washed
ashore without the fault of the owner.” Id. at 893. The court’s mention of necessity justifying
noninjurious trespass makes it possible to reconcile this result with Weise. At any rate, the
statement in Lebanon Lumber is dicta, as the court concluded that McDowell Creek was not
navigable under the log-float test three years before the Guilliams decision expanded the
definition of navigable waters to include all Oregon waters capable of recreational boating. See
supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text.
247 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (en banc).
248 See supra notes 222–33 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 30, 222, 238 and accompanying text; supra note 243.
250 See supra notes 73, 219–20, 232 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Oregon PTD is more robust than generally recognized to date.251
The doctrine is a background principle of state property law, reflecting the
pre-statehood principle that as sovereign trustee, the state must manage
public water and wildlife resources for the benefit of present and future
generations.252 The PTD is actually shorthand for a collection of Oregon
doctrines protecting public usufructuary rights in natural resources,
including public rights to navigate on public highways like beaches and
waterways, public ownership of water, and sovereign ownership of
wildlife.253 The PTD unifies common law doctrines that recognize public
rights to use trust resources, including customary rights to use Oregon
beaches recognized in Hay.254 Although the origins of Oregon’s PTD lie in
longstanding public ownership of waters and wildlife, and the public
highways language from the Northwest Ordinance in the Statehood Act,255
the PTD is quite vibrant, reflected in both historic and modern statutes, as
well as modern case law concerning state ownership of wildlife and public
rights to use waters and ocean beaches.256
The 2005 AG opinion recognized the long history of the Oregon PTD,
but mischaracterized it as a doctrine solely related to state land ownership,
when in fact public navigation rights are usufructuary in nature, arising out
of public ownership of water and wildlife, as well as the public navigation
easement in waters and beaches.257 This confusion encouraged the AG to
erect a separate “public use” doctrine that the opinion ought to have
recognized as part of the PTD, stemming from public navigation rights and
public water ownership.258 The AG’s failure to recognize the proper scope of
251 As in the 2005 AG Opinion, some scholars have examined the scope of the state PTD
concerning ownership of submerged lands without discussing public rights stemming from
public ownership of water, seeming to assume the basis of PTD is ownership of submerged
land. See, e.g., Michael B. Huston & Beverly Jane Ard, The Public Trust Doctrine in Oregon, 19
ENVTL. L. 623, 625, 629 (1989); Scott B. Yates, A Case for the Extension of the Public Trust
Doctrine in Oregon, 27 ENVTL. L. 663, 667 (1997). Another commentator assumed that the PTD
has protected public recreational uses only since 1978. See Danielle Spiegel, Can the Public
Trust Doctrine Save Western Groundwater?, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 412, 442–43 (2010). But see
supra notes 59–60, 93–120 (discussing the Oregon Supreme Court’s recognition of public
recreational rights within the scope of the navigation easement in the 1918 Guilliams decision
and the 1936 Luscher decision).
252 See Sax, supra note 5, at 482 (commenting that “it hardly seems sensible to ask for a
freezing of any future specific configuration of policy judgments, for that result would seriously
hamper the government’s attempts to cope with the problems caused by changes in the needs
and desires of the citizenry”).
253 See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text; see also Wood, supra note 182, at 612
(describing state trust obligations and the remedies available to the public when the state fails
to fulfill its duties).
254 Hay, 62 P.2d 671, 676–77 (Or. 1969) (describing how “the dry-sand area along the Pacific
shore . . . has been used by the public as public recreational land according to an unbroken
custom running back in time as long as the land has been inhabited”).
255 See, e.g., supra notes 30, 66, 84, 124–25, 136, 185 and accompanying text.
256 See supra Parts III, IV.
257 See, e.g., supra notes 30, 66, 84, 124–25, 136, 185 and accompanying text.
258 See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text.
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the PTD is no mere conceptual difference between public proprietary
ownership and public use rights: the interpretation was grounded on a
confusion of proprietary ownership with sovereign ownership.259 In the
recent Simpson decision, the Oregon Court of Appeals accurately
distinguished sovereign ownership obligations from state proprietary rights,
explaining that these sovereign duties have always burdened
proprietary rights.260
The misguided proprietary ownership model of the PTD in the 2005 AG
Opinion also obscures the central role of the PTD concerning public
ownership of water and wildlife and public access to ocean beaches. As
sovereign trustee, the state has owned water and wildlife in trust for the
public since statehood.261 Sovereign ownership means that the state not only
has police power authority to protect and allocate these resources, but has a
duty to preserve them for present and future generations—as well as the
ability to seek damages for private misuse.262 Although both water and
wildlife are the subject of considerable statutory attention,263 judicial
interpretation of how the state implements these statutes should reflect the
fact that sovereign ownership of trust resources preceded the statutes and
exists independently of them.264
Sovereign ownership and the public navigation easement also justify
Oregon’s customary rights approach to providing public rights to use all

259
260

See supra notes 39–45, 190, infra notes 260–65 and accompanying text.
See Simpson, 255 P.3d 565, 571 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (“The view that property rights in wild

animals lie in the sovereign was adopted in America, including by the Oregon Supreme Court.”
(citing State v. Hume, 95 P. 808, 810 (Or. 1908))); see also State v. McGuire, 33 P. 666, 669 (Or.
1893) (affirming the state’s sovereign power to regulate wildlife harvests); State v. Schuman, 58
P. 661, 663 (Or. 1899); State v. Fisher, 98 P. 713, 715 (Or. 1908); State v. Pulos, 129 P. 128, 130
(Or. 1913) (upholding the defendant’s conviction for possessing a wild duck out of season
because the statute did not except ducks captured during open season, and explaining that “title
to wild game is in the state, and . . . the taking of them is not a right, but is a privilege, which
may be restricted, prohibited, or conditioned, as the lawmaking power may see fit”).
261 See supra notes 136, 140–145 and accompanying text (water); supra notes 182–191 and
accompanying text (wildlife).
262 See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 178, at 708; Wood, supra note 182, at 612.
263 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 24, 1909, ch. 221, 1909 Or. Laws 370, 370 (codified as amended at OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 536–558 (2011)) (“All water within the State from all sources of water supply
belong to the public.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.110 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 498.002(1) (2011)
(“Wildlife is the property of the state. No person shall angle for, take, hunt, trap or possess, or
assist another in angling for, taking, hunting, trapping or possessing any wildlife in violation of
the wildlife laws or of any rule promulgated pursuant thereto.”).
264 See Simpson, 255 P.3d at 571 (“It is a generally recognized principle that migratory fish in
the navigable waters of a state, like game within its borders, are classed as animals ferae
naturae, the title to which, so far as that claim is capable of being asserted before possession is
obtained, is held by the state, in its sovereign capacity in trust for all its citizens.” (quoting State
v. Hume, 95 P. 808, 810 (Or. 1908)); Ctr. for Biodiversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d
588, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“The wild game within a state belongs to the people in their
collective, sovereign capacity. It is not the subject of private ownership, except in so far as the
people may elect to make it so; and they may, if they see fit, absolutely prohibit the taking of it,
or any traffic or commerce in it, if deemed necessary for its protection or preservation, or the
public good.” (quoting Ex parte Maier, 37 P. 402, 404 (Cal. 1894)); see also supra notes 209–14
and accompanying text (discussing Ctr. for Biological Diversity).
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ocean beaches.265 The Oregon Supreme Court has declared that customary
beach access rights are “background principles” of state law,266 insulating the
exercise of those rights from private claims landowners for constitutional
compensation,267 because those rights have existed since at least statehood.268
Indeed, so have public rights to navigate and fish based on state ownership
of water and wildlife.269 Thus, no less than customary public rights to access
ocean beaches, public navigation, and wildlife harvest rights are background
principles of state property law. Linking public rights in water, wildlife, and
beaches under the PTD will help state courts resolve some outstanding
issues, like whether and to what extent private uplands may be subject to a
public easement when necessary to enable public access to trust waters.
The Oregon PTD has been underappreciated. The 2005 AG Opinion
mistakenly connected the PTD with bed land ownership, instead of
grounding its origins in public navigation rights and public water ownership.
Recognizing its usufructuary nature would correct the narrow interpretation
given to the doctrine in the 2005 AG opinion. Understanding the distinction
between the sovereign ownership of the PTD and ordinary proprietary
ownership should allow courts and the AG to see that the PTD unifies public
ownership of water and wildlife and customary rights to ocean beaches.
Unifying public trust and sovereign ownership doctrines would make clear
that the state holds natural resources like water, wildlife, and beaches in
trust for all its citizens, and that trust burdens the state with protective
duties as well as allocation authority. The PTD, a collection of
constitutional, statutory, and common law principles providing public use
rights in waters, beaches, and wildlife since statehood in 1859, offers Oregon
an important vehicle for sustainably managing state-owned resources in the
twenty-first century.
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See supra notes 218–41 and accompanying text.
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Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1207 (1994) (“Applying the Lucas analysis to this case, we conclude that the common-law
doctrine of custom . . . ‘inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles
of the State’s law of property and nuisance already placed upon land ownership.’” (quoting
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (2003)).
267 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (2003) (explaining that the state can
regulate property consistent with background principles of nuisance and property law without
owing constitutional compensation).
268 Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969) (observing that public rights to use Oregon beaches
have burdened sovereign and private title since “the beginning of the state’s political history”).
269 See supra notes 136, 140–43 (discussing public ownership of water), 182–91 (discussing
public ownership of wildlife) and accompanying text.
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